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Abstract 
 
Vast disparities exist between China’s rural and urban areas. Throughout the history 
of Communist Party rule, ever-widening rural-urban inequality, problems with 
migration to the cities, and the threat of rural unrest have afflicted the countryside. 
Efforts by previous administrations have largely failed to solve the nation’s rural 
problems. China’s current leaders are determined to tackle these issues by means of a 
change in the direction in policy: the new focus is on sustainable development and 
social justice rather than rapid economic growth. At the same time, the central 
government hopes to strengthen the Communist Party’s power base and reduce 
potential threats to its ongoing reign. While the new policy direction is expected to 
improve the standard of living of China’s rural people and reduce social conflict in the 
short term, it may be insufficient to bring peace and satisfaction among the people in 
the long term. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This study seeks to investigate the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party 
and China’s rural problems. It focuses on three problems of particular concern to 
China’s current rulers: rural-urban inequality, migration to the cities, and rural unrest. 
It will place these problems in the context of the central government’s attempts to deal 
with them since 1949. It will also attempt to assess the extent to which the problems 
of the countryside threaten China’s social stability and the sustainability of the 
Communist Party rule, and it will ask whether the government’s attempts to resolve 
those problems are likely to succeed. While this study covers four generations of 
Party leadership, the focus will be on the response of the current government to the 
three problems in question. 
In most cases, history will be broken into four main sections according to the 
paramount Party leader of the day: Mao Zedong’s era (1949-1978); the reign of Deng 
Xiaoping (1978 – mid 1990s); Jiang Zemin’s era (mid 1990s-2002); and Hu Jintao’s 
rule (2002-present). It should be noted that the dates applied to these four eras are 
used loosely in this study, and are not fixed in concrete. For example, it is well-known 
that Mao died in 1976, but the two years following his death were not much different 
from Mao’s time due to Hua Guofeng’s policy of keeping to Mao’s ideology and 
commands; dramatic changes in policy did not come until Deng Xiaoping’s economic 
reforms beginning in 1978. Similarly, in the first chapter, Deng’s reign has been 
broken into two sections merely because the reforms implemented in his early years 
had very different implications for the peasants than the reforms that he introduced 
later. 
What is the significance of this study? Firstly, the rural population has always 
been in the majority in China. While urbanisation is taking place at an increasingly 
rapid rate today, the bulk of China’s people can still be classified as ‘rural’, with an 
official source putting the percentage of rural dwellers in 2005 at 57% of China’s total 
population.1 If we define the term ‘rural’ more generously, the figure is far larger, and 
another article points to the figure from the National Bureau of Statistics, which states 
that the rural population is more than 900 million, or 70.8 percent of the national 
                                                 
1 People’s life, n.d. 
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total.
2
 While statistics vary, mostly due to the millions of rural migrant workers who 
float between the countryside and the cities and therefore may or may not be counted 
as rural, people with close ties to the countryside are still the vast majority of China’s 
population.  
 Secondly, this study will help to explain the evolution of and the reasons for 
the sharp demarcation between the rural and the urban areas. While it is not 
uncommon for a rural-urban gap to exist in developing countries, in China it is 
believed that this gap is uncommonly great for the nation’s current state of 
development, and that this has been the result of both natural phenomena and state 
policy. This study seeks to describe and explain these phenomena and policies. 
 Thirdly, a study of the relationship between China’s rural problems and the 
ruling Party is important because of the rural population’s role in establishing 
Communist Party rule and advancing China’s economic growth. The Chinese 
Communist Party’s 1949 victory would not have been possible without the support of 
multitudes of peasants, and China could not have attained its current level of 
economic development without their contribution. The Party thus owes much to the 
nation’s rural population. This study seeks to evaluate the historical response of the 
Party to its rural heritage and early power base, and to assess the Party’s ability to 
maintain the favour and support of the rural people.  
 
                                                 
2 Agriculture: lifeblood of the nation, 2005 
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Chapter 1 
Rural-Urban Inequality 
  
Inequality between the cities and the countryside is an age-old problem in China. This 
chapter seeks to investigate and explain the evolution of rural-urban inequality, and 
will examine the way in which the various generations of leaders have dealt with this 
problem over the course of the history of Communist rule in China. Four major 
periods of Communist Party history will be covered – the Maoist era, the early Deng 
era, the late Deng and Jiang era, and the Hu era – each era being referred to by the 
name of its most prominent leader or leaders.  
 Questions that this chapter seeks to answer are: Has the countryside always 
lagged behind in the cities during the history of the People’s Republic? During which 
periods have peasants been objects of exploitation, and during which periods have 
they lived under favourable conditions? How have the progressive phases of 
government policy influenced the degree of rural-urban inequality? To what extent 
has the Chinese Communist Party been responsible for the rural-urban gap, and what 
have been the other factors involved? How successful are current government policies 
likely to be in addressing the problem of inequality? Finally, is rural-urban inequality 
a threat to the Communist Party’s rule in China? 
 
Mao’s Era 
 
The time of Mao’s chairmanship of the Party is an era during which peasants suffered 
a great deal as a result of inequality. It should be acknowledged at this point that 
rural-urban inequality had existed long before the CCP came to power, and the 
Communists merely inherited this problem; they did not initiate it. Not only did great 
inequalities exist, but much of China was also poverty-stricken, and so its new leaders 
embarked on a mission to eradicate poverty and develop the nation by building 
socialism.3 However, Mao’s era was a time of great contradictions. Although under 
Mao the Communist Party allegedly sought to create an egalitarian society and 
propagated this idea widely, in reality the period 1949-1976 laid the foundation for 
                                                 
3 Spence, 1990, p.541 
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the major exploitation of the peasantry. Great inequality lay hidden beneath the 
semblance of equality. 
The exploitation of the peasants during the reign of Mao was played out in 
three main situations. Firstly, it was from the countryside that the CCP extracted the 
majority of funding for urban industrialisation. Secondly, although the peasant tax 
burden was already heavy, the peasants were not entitled to the social benefits that 
urban workers were granted, contributing to the existing problem of inequality. 
Thirdly, it was the peasants who bore the brunt of the catastrophic Great Leap 
Forward.  
  During Mao’s time the peasants were greatly exploited as a result of the 
Party’s drive to modernise and industrialise the nation. Earlier on in Soviet history, 
Lenin had had the original idea of extracting money from agriculture to fund the 
industrialisation of the cities.4 Stalin then took this idea to an extreme in the 1930s. 
The same concept was applied to the Chinese context after the People’s Republic was 
founded. Several stages were involved in the socioeconomic reform of the countryside 
in order to extract the surplus necessary for funding industrialisation. 
 The Party needed to treat the peasants well when it first came to power. The 
peasantry, comprising the bulk of China’s population, were a crucial component of 
society to the Chinese Communist Party – in fact, during the Communist-Kuomintang 
civil war and in the early years of Communist rule, they formed the majority of the 
Party’s power base. After the Communist victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, the 
new ruling Party had to maintain this power base by way of the continued support of 
the peasants. The land reform process was one of the Party’s chief measures for 
sustaining this support.  
One of the main procedures during the land reform period, which occurred 
during the years 1950 to 1952, was the confiscation of land from the landlords – a 
parasitic class for which Mao saw no use. Members of this former rich, exploiting 
class were also severely persecuted. This social and political humiliation was one of 
the purposes of the land reform process; rural China’s landlords were effectively 
“liquidated as a class” during these early years of Communist rule.5 This gave 
peasants a chance settle old scores with their enemies, as they had done during a 
similar experimental period of land reform in the late 1940s before the CCP had come 
                                                 
4 Meisner, 1999, p.106 
5 Barnett, 1953, p.189 
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to power.
6
 Once confiscated, the land was divided into small lots and redistributed 
among all peasants, including those who were poor and previously landless. During 
this time the peasants gained revolutionary experience and were able to feel that they 
had new power to direct their destiny.
7
 They were also able to strengthen their 
commitment to the Party through the process of verbally denouncing their former 
oppressors. In this way the peasants were allowed to feel a debt of gratitude towards 
the Party for their new-found freedom from exploitation. The Party took pride in 
claiming that, for once in Chinese history, those who laboured and tilled the soil were 
the ones who owned the land, despite the fact that this phase of family farming was to 
be short lived. Although poverty was still a problem in these early years, peasants 
were in general no longer taken advantage of by idle land-owners. Thus in the first 
few years of Communist Party rule, it appeared that peasants – at least the poor ones –
were a favoured sector of society, since the land reform process allowed families to 
farm independently rather than being oppressed by rich landlords.  
Despite the Party’s seemingly good intentions towards the peasants, however, 
land reform failed to bring the countryside up to the same standard of living as that of 
the cities; while the economic disparity was somewhat diminished, “it was by no 
means an egalitarian leveling”.
8
 Inequality also persisted within the countryside. What 
is more, farmers’ incomes were restricted because the grain procurement system 
instituted during land reform prohibited them from making private grain sales. Under 
this system, the peasants were obliged to sell more than a quarter of their grain to the 
state at low prices in order for the government to supply food to the cities; as a result 
the peasantry’s wages were kept low.9 This was an indication that the Party was 
beginning to have more and more control not only over the rural economy but over 
society as well. Meisner writes that the introduction of political activity in the lives of 
the peasants was the Party’s means of establishing a power base in the villages, with 
the purpose of enabling the state to have access to more grain.10 In addition to this, it 
transpired that the period of land reform was only intended to be a temporary stage in 
the rural socioeconomic reforms, and was to be a stepping stone towards the next 
                                                 
6 Spence, 1990, p.492 
7 Meisner, 1999, p.101 
8 Ibid, p.99 
9 Spence, 1990, p.544 
10 Meisner, 1999, pp.100-101 
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stage of socioeconomic reform – the introduction of agricultural collectivisation.
11
 
Although during the land reform process, the Party did make vague references to 
future collectivisation, many peasants were under the impression that individual 
farming was to be a permanent institution under communist rule.
12
  
 In 1953, once the land reform process was in general completed, the 
‘transition to socialism’ was announced. One of the requirements of socialism, 
according to both Marx and Lenin, was the capitalist development of modern industry 
on a large scale – an end which China had not yet reached. The backward economic 
situation in China also conflicted with Marx’s idea that for a country to skip the stage 
of modern capitalism and jump to socialism while still experiencing major economic 
deficiencies was a dangerous path to go down.13 Indeed, China had a very weak 
industrial sector in the early 1950s. Despite this deficiency, however, the First Five-
Year Plan called for the development of heavy industry, in line with the Soviet 
method for rapid industrial growth. In order to achieve this development, thousands of 
Russian scientists and technical advisers were sent to China to aid the development of 
industry and infrastructure under the Sino-Soviet agreement.14 The important fact to 
note here is that it was from the countryside that the State would draw the majority of 
capital needed to finance this industrialisation process. China’s leaders were 
convinced that large-scale agricultural collectivisation would be able to produce the 
surplus agricultural production that the nation needed to fund industrialisation.
15
 Thus 
agriculture was gradually collectivised throughout China, beginning with the 
formation of mutual aid teams, followed by cooperatives and then collective farms. 
It was the peasants, as the principal taxpayers, who provided most of the 
capital to support industrialisation. Not only did they have to pay heavy taxes in grain, 
but, under the grain procurement system, they were also obliged to sell high quotas of 
their grain to the State at low prices determined by the government. As mentioned 
above, the Party had already established a high level of control in the countryside, 
making tax collection and grain procurement possible. Roughly 30 percent of farm 
proceeds went to both the central and local governments.16 Friedman writes, “Since 
1953, by state confiscation of grain (called state purchase), by state prohibition of 
                                                 
11 Barnett, 1953, p.188 
12 Ibid, p.189 
13 Ibid, p.104 
14 Spence, 1990, p.544 
15 Barnett, 1953, p.190 
16 Knight and Song, 1999, p.12 
 11 
 
physical mobility after 1960, and by payment to farmers at below-market prices, 
China’s rural dwellers had been ruined by repressive institutions and exploitation that 
were legitimated as socialism”.
17
 
The peasants suffered in other ways, too. During much of the Maoist era, they 
were not allowed the use of private plots of land. This assertion of control over 
farmers’ agricultural activity ensured that the state could extract as much produce as 
possible from the countryside. This also had the effect of preventing farmers from 
earning any additional income that might supplement their meagre wages. The 
prohibition of private land reduced peasant incomes and increased rural-urban 
disparity. One campaign during which this ban on private plots was particularly 
disastrous was during the Great Leap Forward, when private plots might have helped 
peasants survive during the worst of the famine. Also, during much of the Maoist era, 
there were no free markets on which farmers could sell their produce. Prices were 
strictly controlled by the State, and this contributed to low rural incomes. Some 
exceptions were made during certain periods – for example, after the Great Leap 
Forward, government policy was relaxed to allow for some private plots for a limited 
amount of time, while some communes temporarily broke down into cooperatives.
18
 
However, this relaxation was short-lived, and farming on private plots was abolished 
once again during the Cultural Revolution. 
China’s peasants did at times react against state control over agriculture. There 
were a number of large-scale decollectivisation movements between 1956 and 1978, 
initiated by farmers disillusioned with collectivised agriculture and eager to return to 
family farming. Kate Zhou identifies four such movements, of which the first three 
were crushed.19 This suppression implies that China’s leaders firmly believed that 
collective farming would benefit the peasants and the nation. In particular, the success 
of the massive irrigation and water conservation projects undertaken by peasants 
between 1957 and 1958 spurred Party leaders to believe that agriculture could also be 
radically transformed by a united effort by the peasantry.20 Not only this, but the Party 
was committed to having firm control over farming in order to maximise the amount 
of grain it could take from the peasants, and the retention of collective farms was 
significant in this aspect. Michael Kochin writes that in both the Chinese and Soviet 
                                                 
17 In Zhou, 1996, p.xiii 
18 Spence, 1990, p.581 
19 Zhou, 1996, p.30 
20 Spence, 1990, p.578 
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regimes, “Only by expropriating the peasantry completely through collectivization 
could the state achieve both high levels of investment in agriculture and high levels of 
extraction.”
21
 
 Thirdly, peasants were tied to the land. Migration to the cities, particularly 
during certain periods, was extremely restricted. Although early on in the Maoist era 
and then later during the Great Leap Forward, farmers began to flock to the cities, 
searching for jobs in the early days of industrialisation, this movement was quickly 
quelled by way of the strict hukou system, or household registration system. The 
institution of the hukou system meant that farmers’ means of income were limited. 
Because farmers were tied to the land, the state could ensure that as many as possible 
were engaged in grain production. The issue of rural-urban migration will be 
discussed in more depth in the following chapter.  
 It should be acknowledged that while rural dwellers endured great hardship 
compared to those in urban areas during this first era, it was not Mao’s intention to 
make the peasants suffer. It is well-known that he was fond of peasants, believing that 
they were innocent, simple and pure. They were for the most part illiterate and 
politically ignorant. Mao saw the peasants’ China as “blank”, “avid for change” and 
“filled with revolutionary spirit”.
22
 As such they were inherently malleable and were 
the ideal type from which to form the Communist ‘new man.’ By building socialism, 
Mao also wanted to raise the standard of living of the peasants and reduce rural-urban 
inequality. This can be seen in Mao’s launching of the Cultural Revolution: his aim 
was, in part, to reconcile two of the “three great differences,” which were differences 
between the town and the countryside, and between workers and peasants.23 It should 
not be inferred, however, that, because of Mao’s strong ideals regarding 
egalitarianism, such a society was achieved. Zhao Renwei writes that although social 
equity was a key goal of policy-makers in the pre-reform era, inequality, including 
rural-urban income inequality, did exist. He argues that while pre-reform China was a 
reasonably equal society in terms of income distribution, this did not entail that the 
standard of living or the welfare system were equal.24 
After the launching of the first 5-year plan, Mao began to advocate the 
speeding up of the socialisation process in the countryside. In the summer of 1955, he 
                                                 
21 Kochin, 1996, p.725 
22 Schram, as cited in Liu, 1971, p.29 
23 Meisner, 1999, p.368 
24 Zhao, 2001, pp.26-27 
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emphasised his belief that the purpose of agricultural collectivisation should not be 
viewed merely as a method of extracting more and more funds from the peasants 
through increased production, but also as a solution for raising the living standards of 
the peasants and bringing them other social and economic benefits.
25
 Ironically, it was 
during the phase of collectivised agriculture that the peasants suffered the most in 
Mao’s era.  
 It is important to note here that Mao occasionally overrode the wishes of other 
top-ranking Party officials, and that decisions made during the first decade and a half 
of Communist Party rule were not necessarily representative of the majority of the 
Party. A number of Mao’s ideas were considerably more radical than those of other 
Party leaders. For example, while some leaders preferred to follow the Soviet pattern 
of socioeconomic development rather rigidly, Maoist leaders rejected this in favour of 
what was often a more radical version of socialism. Towards the end of Mao’s rule, 
however, anyone who dared to oppose his decrees was in danger of severe humiliation 
and expulsion from their position. This can be seen in the example of Liu Shaoqi, 
who, once considered second-in-command after Mao, fell from grace in the Cultural 
Revolution. 
 Not only did the extent of rural-urban inequality in Maoist China exist because 
the countryside was made to support the cities through the grain quota and heavy 
taxes, but also because farmers were not entitled to the social welfare that city-
dwellers enjoyed. The ‘iron rice bowl,’ or tie fanwan, allowed urban workers access 
to services such as education, health care and housing, and these benefits were 
guaranteed for life. No such benefits existed in the countryside, however. This put 
rural-dwellers at a serious disadvantage.  
 Another reason why rural-dwellers were poorly off compared to urban 
residents in Mao’s China was because of the disaster of the famine which occurred 
during the Great Leap Forward. One of the government’s motives for relying so 
heavily on agricultural production during the Leap was in order to repay the enormous 
debt owed to the Soviet Union for its former aid in industrialisation projects. In order 
to meet the government’s demand for high grain production, rural cadres began 
competing with each other to produce high quantities of grain and so gain the favour 
of the central government. These cadres even went to the extent of misquoting 
                                                 
25 Meisner, 1999, p.140 
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production figures, as well as using harmful farming methods such as sowing too 
early, growing unsuitable crops, and planting seeds too close together in order to 
outdo other communes.
26
 As rural cadres had a lot of power and influence over the 
peasants under their jurisdiction, many peasants also joined in this competition, even 
disregarding their knowledge of conventional agricultural practices. As the central 
government set the grain tax based on these erroneous production figures, it took 
much more grain than the peasants could afford to give, and the rural areas 
consequently suffered a terrible grain shortage, exacerbated by unfavourable climatic 
conditions. Also during this time, grain exports to the Soviet Union rose in order to 
pay for heavy machinery that China needed, so less grain was available to the Chinese 
themselves. While an average of 205 kilograms of grain had been available to each 
person in China’s rural areas in 1957, this figure fell consistently over the following 
four years, ending in a trifling 154 kilograms in 1961.27 The result was one of the 
worst famines recorded in Chinese history. It was the peasants who bore the brunt of 
this famine. While Spence believes that the famine took 20 million lives or more,28 
Becker suggests that as many as 30 or 40 million people died − figures differ so 
greatly because the available reports vary widely.
29
 While urban residents also faced 
food shortages during this time, there were very few in the cities who died due to 
starvation. This catastrophic event signifies the tragedy of political hype taking 
precedence over common sense. While it shows a certain amount of neglect of 
countryside on the part of the central government, local officials and even peasants 
themselves were also partially to blame. If the top Party leaders had had a real idea of 
what was going on in the rural areas, they would have likely put an end to the 
competitiveness in favour of more realistic grain production strategies.  
 
The Early Deng Era 
 
Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1978, the peasants’ lot began to change. The 
next section will outline the trend of rural-urban inequality under the rule of Deng 
Xiaoping. Deng’s reign as China’s top leader is divided into two segments in this 
chapter. This is because during his early years in power, the plight of the peasants was 
                                                 
26 Becker, 1996, p.111 
27 Spence, 1990, p.583 
28 Ibid, p.583 
29 Becker, 1996, p.230 
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significantly different to that towards the end of his rule. The section immediately 
below will examine the changes that occurred in the early Deng era and the effects of 
these changes on China’s rural residents.  
 The country was so economically impaired in the aftermath of the Cultural 
Revolution that drastic measures needed to be taken to improve the livelihood of the 
people and to help China to catch up with the rest of the world. As in the Maoist era, 
the countryside was overpopulated and underproductive. To cite an example of the 
slow growth that rural China was experiencing, Harry Harding states that per capita 
incomes in the countryside had increased at an average rate of merely 1.6 per cent 
from 1957 to 1979.30 
One of the first elements of reform undertaken by Deng’s administration from 
1978 was the agrarian reform, intended to loosen up the rural economy. Following the 
dismantling of the system of collectivised agriculture, a system of family farming 
returned to rural China with the introduction of the household responsibility, or 
baochan daohu. Under this system, while peasants did not essentially own the land 
they farmed (even though a certain degree of private ownership of enterprises and 
businesses in China was allowed under the reforms, which was mostly limited to 
ownership of enterprises and businesses), they settled contracts with their production 
team for use of the land. Farmers were obliged to pay a quota of their produce to the 
team to fulfill the state tax and grain requirements, but were more or less free to farm 
as they pleased. This was the first time in a long time when farmers were granted a 
choice in what they produced. The return to family farming was supposed to 
encourage agricultural production, since collectivised agriculture had proved to be 
largely ineffective. According to Kochin, “The same scheme of expropriation that 
produced efficiencies in extraction from peasant consumption … also produced 
inefficiencies in production and investment allocation.”31 
Kate Zhou argues that in some areas it was the farmers, not the central 
government, who initiated the return to family farming in the late 1970s; the 
government’s actual role, she believes, was legalising and propagating the 
decollectivisation movement rather than initiating it.32 She believes that the farmers 
are due more credit for the decollectivisation process than they have so far received. 
                                                 
30 Harding, 1987, p.32 
31 Kochin, 1996, p.732 
32 Zhou, 1996, p.9 
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While this may be true of some enthusiastic farmers in a limited number of regions, in 
reality the state enforced the baochan daohu system all over China, whether or not the 
peasants were willing to leave the collective system. The fact that China’s leaders 
legitimised the move to return to family farming indicates that they saw that the entire 
nation could benefit from the increased productivity in the countryside, thus central 
government policy can be ultimately credited for the benefits that peasants gained 
from the return to family farming.  
In many cases, family farming was more efficient than communal farming, 
and the majority of peasants were initially better off than they had been during the 
Cultural Revolution due to increased production. The government also paid much 
higher prices for grain and other agricultural products, which provided an additional 
incentive for farmers to increase production. As a result of the increase in prices paid 
for grain, as well as the introduction of a free market and alternative income sources, 
over 200 million peasants escaped from extreme poverty after the beginning of the 
reforms.33 One World Bank estimate suggests that rural poverty in China dropped by 
about two thirds from 1978 to 1985.34 According to one set of figures, rural per capita 
income (in real terms) increased more than 10 percent per year from 1978 to 1984.
35
 
This income growth in the countryside even helped to reduce the rural-urban gap at 
the outset.  
The variety of rural employment activities increased dramatically as a result of 
the early reforms. Rural residents were no longer restricted to growing staple crops 
such as grain. Specialised households that grew cash crops or opened small businesses 
such as repair shops saw a rapid increase in income, profiting much more than those 
who continued to grow ordinary staple crops.36 Not only did this provide a valuable 
source of income for families, but it also succeeded in making country life more 
colourful and enabled rural residents to have a more varied diet (although many 
peasants took the bulk of their produce to urban areas for sale). It can be noted, 
however, that the development of specialised households also contributed to income 
inequality within the countryside itself. 
The development of rural industries, particularly in the form of township and 
village enterprises (TVEs), also prompted an economic boom in the countryside in the 
                                                 
33 Rozelle, Park, Benziger and Ren, as cited in Oi, 1999b, p.616 
34 Zhang, as cited in Song, 2005, p.5 
35 Rozelle, 1996, p.64 
36 Meisner, 1999, p.462 
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early years of Deng’s rule. TVEs were born in very primitive forms during the Maoist 
era, but during those early years they were limited to the function of supporting 
agriculture.
37
 However, these rural enterprises took off in the post-Mao era. Beginning 
in the 1980s, the Chinese government allowed farmers to engage in rural industry 
under the slogan li tu bu li xiang, jin chang bu jin cheng (leave the field but not the 
countryside; enter the factory but not the city). Thus farmers could participate in non-
agricultural activities while still living in rural areas.38 Rural non-agricultural 
activities were not limited to manufacturing-type industries, but also included 
construction, commerce and transportation. The new policy, while attempting to keep 
rural to urban migration rates low, enabled surplus rural workers to find alternative 
forms of employment. Oi states that by the middle of the 1980s, rural industry had 
become the fastest growing sector in the Chinese economy.39 Koo and Yeh attribute 
the initial boom in the TVEs to a number of factors: 
the peasants were highly motivated to increase their incomes, the 
surplus workers were eager to seek employment, the economic 
transition provided the opportunity, the entrepreneurs led the drive, and 
the local officials lent their political support for the rural enterprises to 
develop, at a time when the central authorities allowed, albeit 
hesitantly, the transition to proceed in the rural areas.
40
 
 
It was, on the whole, good to be a peasant in these early days of reforms. 
During the early 1980s, as a result of the changes in policy and the consequent 
economic growth described above, the standard of living of many rural residents 
increased, and many were lifted out of poverty. According to the 1998 China 
Statistical Yearbook, net income increased from less than 150 yuan per year in 1978 
to almost 400 yuan in 1985.
41
 Another source cites an increase in mean per capita 
income for rural households of approximately 250 percent between 1978 and 1987, 
not accounting for inflation.
42
 However, the early boom in the countryside generated 
by the reforms did not last forever. 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Naughton, 1999, p.302 
38 Ho, 1995, p.360 
39 Oi, 1999b, p.616 
40 Koo and Yeh, 1999, p.324 
41 As cited in Oi, 1999b, p.616 
42 Nee and Su, 1990, p.5 
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The Late Deng and Jiang Eras 
 
Despite the initial increases in peasants’ income and the improvements in agricultural 
methods in the early reform era, prosperity in the countryside was for the most part 
short-lived. While the urban-rural income gap actually narrowed in the early 1980s, 
from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s – which can be considered the second phase of 
Deng’s rule – the disparity between the countryside and the cities became increasingly 
greater.43 This was the beginning of an upward trend in urban-rural inequality. 
According to Song, the rural-urban inequality ratio in 1999 was just as high as it had 
been before the reform era.44  
At this point it is important to understand that when Deng Xiaoping initiated 
the first economic reforms, it was believed that a certain degree of inequality should 
be tolerated because while some people would initially benefit from the reforms, 
universal prosperity would eventually follow. It was not the official purpose of the 
economic reforms to stray from the ultimate goal of socialism – although the element 
of revolution was effectively eliminated from the Chinese version of socialism.45 
Rather, the reforms were intended to spur economic growth, which would in turn help 
China to attain the level of development necessary for building socialism. It was also 
acknowledged that the purest stage of communism would not be attained until a time 
in the remote future. Thus despite the pursuit of socialism in both pre-reform and 
reform China, the foundation that Mao had laid for the historical pattern of peasant 
exploitation was now built on once again, demonstrated by the widening of the rural-
urban gap. What were the reasons for the decline in the farmers’ situation?  
Firstly, Deng’s government, from the mid-1980s onward, similarly to in the 
1950s, relied on the countryside to support urban development. This had been one of 
the purposes – albeit not the only purpose – of encouraging agricultural production 
via the household responsibility system. According to Meisner, the decollectivisation 
of agriculture during Deng’s agrarian reforms in 1979 to 1980 was “motivated by the 
old economic need of the state to extract the surplus from the villages to finance the 
modern economic development of the nation, now known as the Four 
                                                 
43 Zhao, 2001, pp.28-29 
44 Song, 2005, p.7 
45 Dirlik, 1981-1982, p.634 
 19 
 
Modernizations.”
46
 The release of China’s masses from the politicisation of everyday 
life, along with the relaxed economic policy under Deng created an atmosphere fresh 
and different from that of the Maoist era, but the concept of extracting village capital 
to finance growth in the cities was the same. While it can be argued that Deng’s 
reforms also did much to raise the standard of living of rural residents, the key point 
to be grasped here is that the fruits of rural development were used to fuel urban 
development rather than staying in the countryside to sustain rural development.  
 Secondly, by the mid 1980s, the farmers had already reaped all the easy gains 
possible during the early agricultural reforms. After the initial boom in production, 
any additional improvements were impeded by the shortcomings of Chinese 
agriculture – namely the low technological level of agricultural methods and low 
labour productivity. The household responsibility system had allowed the farmers’ 
standard of living to increase rapidly for a few years, but after these years production 
failed to significantly increase. Grain production slowed considerably after 1985.47 
Rozelle understands that from 1984 to 1990, real per capita income in rural areas 
showed essentially no growth; he writes that the average annual rural income in the 
1984-1985 period was 336 yuan per capita, while in 1989-1990 the figure was still a 
mere 338 yuan.
48
 After the initial boom in the agricultural sector, the strategy of 
China’s leaders was to shift their focus to other sectors which could produce rapid 
economic growth. Harding writes: 
The incremental nature of reform – starting with the easier problems 
first, where the gains were likely to be rapid, and where the benefits 
would far outweigh the costs – helped develop and maintain a popular 
base for the reform program. 
 
It can be argued, however, that as well as maintaining the support of its citizens, this 
strategy did create heavy social costs as well as economic benefits – costs which the 
Chinese government is still faced with today. Not everyone was content with their lot, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 A third reason why rural-urban inequality increased during this time is that the 
TVEs, which had been so successful in the 1980s, proved to be problematic from the 
early 1990s.
49
 The productivity of rural industry saw significant declines from this 
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time. Fewsmith gives a variety of reasons for the decreasing success of rural 
industries. In particular, the increasing privatisation of TVEs was no doubt the cause 
of many layings-off and the consequent boost in rural unemployment.
50
 Also, many 
TVEs were plagued by financial woes as they struggled to obtain bank loans from 
state-owned banks; not only this, but many enterprises had made unwise investments, 
the consequences of which proved to be burdensome.51 Eyferth, Ho and Vermeer 
believe that the dramatic growth of rural industries that occurred in the 1980s can be 
attributed to the “pent-up demand after decades of underconsumption” and also to the 
underproductivity and inefficiency of urban state-owned enterprises. By the middle of 
the 1990s, growth from rural industries had for the most part slowed to a halt.52  
Many TVEs suffered a great deal as a result of the nation-wide recession from 
1989 to 1990. Samuel Ho writes that in order to control inflation that had accumulated 
due to rapid economic expansion from 1987 to 1988, interest rates were increased, 
bank credits were limited, many investment projects were put on hold, and price 
control was re-introduced (it had previous been relaxed). While these measures were 
successful in reducing inflation, they also interrupted economic growth. Many non-
agricultural industries such as TVEs, which had become heavily dependent on bank 
credits, suffered during this recession period. Also during this time, a great number of 
workers were laid off, the average annual growth rate of RGVIO (rural gross value of 
industrial output) decreased substantially (from 32 per cent in 1987-1988 to 12 per 
cent in 1989-1990), and a large number of TVEs were closed down.
53
 The recession 
once concluded, rural non-agricultural activities did begin to fare better. In particular, 
Deng Xiaoping’s famous southern tour in 1992 instigated more rapid reforms which 
allowed sensational growth in the national economy. This in turn helped the rural 
economy to grow, particularly in the non-agricultural sectors, although the benefits 
for rural areas were pitiful compared with the rapid growth and development in urban 
areas. Despite the fact that rural industry did initially take off again following the 
recession, it became decreasingly productive during the era of Jiang’s third generation 
of leadership. The inefficiency of many of these enterprises, similarly to the case of 
the urban state-owned enterprises, or SOEs, has had a problematic effect from the 
1990s to the early years of the 21st century.  
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Additionally, while TVEs did much to raise peasants’ incomes and reduce 
rural-urban inequality in their heyday, it should also be acknowledged that the most 
productive TVEs, as well as those which provided the most growth from export, were 
concentrated in eastern coastal regions, while those located in inland regions were not 
as successful. Not only this, but these enterprises did little to ease the burden of 
surplus rural labour in China’s interior.54 This is another example of how inequality 
existed between different regions in the countryside. 
Fourthly, the second wave of reform under Deng for the most part allowed for 
the rapid development of urban areas while the countryside lagged behind. The 
opening up of China’s coastal cities under the ‘Open Door’ policy in the early days of 
the reforms, which was designed to give the cities a head-start in the development 
process, had a significant part to play in generating urban-rural inequality. The coastal 
urban areas, when they were allowed to develop under favourable conditions, became 
prosperous much more quickly than regions that did not benefit from the special 
policies. In particular, the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), mostly located along 
China’s east coast, became rich almost overnight.  
The basis for the introduction of the ‘Open Door’ policy and the establishment 
of Special Economic Zones was China’s need to attract sources of capital from 
outside the country, since at this stage it had so little of its own to rely on. The Open 
Door policy was designed to draw foreign investment and technology into China and 
also to increase China’s export base, since it was those overseas and not those within 
China itself who could afford to spend lots of money to buy Chinese-made products. 
SEZs, which have been described as “export-oriented enclaves … that had, initially, 
almost no links to the remainder of the economy”,55 were initiated at the beginning of 
the Open Door policy, and were intended to be models of reform for the rest of China. 
Xiamen, Shantou, Zhuhai and Shenzhen were the first cities to open up to foreign 
investment and to offer tax incentives to these investors, since they were already the 
most developed regions in China and thus were most favourable for absorbing foreign 
technology and investment.56 While these four zones were initially established, the 
rest of the Chinese eastern coast followed within a decade, so that the coastal regions 
flourished while China’s hinterland still had little in the way of foreign investment. 
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Harding refers to the area of coastal China home to 200 million people as the 
“development belt” which prospered under the influence of imported technology and 
the investment of foreign capital.
57
 It should be noted, however, that despite their 
economic prosperity, the SEZs were rendered places of exploitation of Chinese 
workers by foreign capital, for foreign companies took advantage of the preferential 
policies in these areas.58 
The Open Door policy proved to be a tremendous success for China’s national 
economy. However, the countryside benefited little from this growth, with the 
exception of those peasants who lived in areas close to the wealthy eastern urban 
centres. These peasants profited greatly by selling their produce to rich urban 
residents, or by providing other goods and services to people in the city.  
Yet another reason why the rural-urban divide became increasingly evident in 
the late Deng and Jiang eras is that the government ruthlessly pursued economic 
growth rather than social and economic equality. In the words of Scott Rozelle, at the 
beginning of the reform era, China’s leaders “acknowledged the nation’s need to 
modify its commitment to egalitarianism.”59 Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms 
fuelled a massive economic boom under the guiding principle that “to get rich is 
glorious”, which was complemented by the well-known slogan, “some must get rich 
first.” This latter catch-phrase justified Deng’s belief that rapid economic growth 
could not be pursued in all of China’s regions at the same time, but rather that a few 
already advantaged areas needed to become economic strongholds before 
development could shift to the rest of the country.60 This is commonly referred to as 
the ‘trickle down theory.’ Despite the improved standard of living of the countryside 
and the development that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, economic growth, rather 
than equality, was still the priority of Deng’s government. In fact, Deng even went to 
the extent of propagating the idea that “Low-speed development is equal to stagnation 
or even regression,”61 and that “Slow growth is not socialism”.62 Jiang subsequently 
took this priority to an extreme, launching a virtually uninhibited pursuit of GDP 
growth. During this time, economic growth in the cities was phenomenal, while the 
countryside had little chance to benefit from the national economic growth. This 
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accounts at least in part for the tremendous urban-rural gap that can be observed 
today.  
Following Deng, Jiang Zemin’s government sought to establish a xiaokang 
shehui, or a well-off society. This was intended to produce moderate wealth for the 
bulk of China’s population. In order to achieve this, the government favoured rapid 
economic growth regardless of the social cost. One of the central government’s most 
popular methods used to attain high GDP growth was to focus on attracting fixed-
interest investment, especially from foreign countries, and also to rely greatly on 
exports for revenue. What this mainly accomplished in terms of its influence on 
inequality was that the eastern coastal region, which had the benefit of a longer 
history of foreign investment and more developed transport and communications, 
grew much richer than the inland and western regions. During the Jiang era, China 
certainly did prosper overall, but the problem of inequality also worsened, particularly 
in terms of the rural-urban divide. Interestingly enough, rural poverty continued to 
decrease even while the rural-urban gap was widening. According to Song, rural 
poverty fell from 35 percent in 1988 to 16 percent in 2002, using the dollar a day 
poverty line.
63
 However, while some rural households did attain the goal of xiaokang, 
many remained in poverty or severely disadvantaged. The tax burden also remained 
too high a price for many farmers to pay – an issue that will be discussed further on in 
this chapter. 
The debt of village and township governments is another reason why the rural 
areas lagged behind. The fiscal decentralisation begun under Deng made local 
governments responsible for accumulating the bulk of their revenue. Then in 1994, 
according to one article on China’s government web portal, grassroots governments 
began sharing tax revenue with the central government, which meant that the burden 
of education, social security, health care and wage payment was left primarily in the 
hands of the grassroots government while these local governments were deprived of 
many of their former sources of revenue, with the exception of the agricultural, 
industrial and commercial taxes. Furthermore, many local governments borrowed 
funds to invest in infrastructure and resources in order to comply with the legislation 
prescribing compulsory education, but a number of these governments were unable to 
extricate themselves from debt. The same article describes local debt as “the biggest 
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block to deeper rural reform”.
64
 Thus rural-urban inequality impacted rural 
governments and not just individual farmers. 
 It is important to recognise that the vast rural-urban gap that opened up in the 
reform era has not been limited to income inequality, but also extended to inequality 
of education and health care facilities and services. (Indeed, educational attainment 
can be linked to income in many cases.) Song asserts that “The most important factor 
affecting a person’s educational attainment, or enrolment, after her age, is whether she 
lives in a rural or urban area”.65 She explains that rural dwellers are, on average, less 
educated than urban dwellers by a mean of 4.6 years, and that rural areas have lower 
quality teachers and less expenditure per pupil in comparison with city schools.  
While education was compulsory and free by law, the reform era saw a crisis 
of school drop-outs in rural areas. Becker comments on the compulsory education law 
that was instituted in 1986. He writes that the problem with this law was that local 
governments were expected to finance the bulk of the costs of education. The result 
was that many schools charged admission or extra fees. A large number of families 
could not afford to send their children to school, and consequently “The shortage of 
government funds led to an acute crisis as the drop-out rate in primary schools 
reached 35 per cent or some 8 million children. In poor rural areas these were usually 
girls”.
66
 This is one reason that illiteracy remained a problem in rural China. 
According to a population sample survey in 2005, the total illiterate population aged 
15 and over numbered 11.04 per cent; 16.15 per cent of females aged 15 and over 
were illiterate, while the figure for males was only 5.86 per cent.67 To add to the 
problem, the tax reform of 1994 wreaked havoc on the countryside’s education and 
health care system because of the negative effect the reform had on township and 
village finances.68 
 Funding rural education remained a colossal task. According to a news story 
on China’s government web portal, schools in rural areas made up the bulk of the 
nation’s schools at the time of writing. That is, 95.2 per cent of primary schools, 87.6 
per cent of intermediate (junior high) schools and 71.5 per cent of (senior) high 
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schools were located in rural areas.
69
 While these figures include county and town 
schools, these figures indicate that the problem did not lie in the lack of schools, but 
in families’ lack of finances to put towards their children’s education. A 2005 article 
states that “To have all rural teachers in China get paid, a total of 93.1 billion yuan 
(US$11.3 billion) is needed per year, or 6.2 percent of the total revenue of the central 
budget in 2004”.70 This illustrates how much money is necessary to go towards 
education in order to increase its success and productivity; paying teachers’ salaries is 
just one part of the total expense of education. Yet very recently, according to the 
Population Reference Bureau, China spent a mere 2% of its GDP on public health and 
only 1.46% on education.71 
Along with the single-minded pursuit of economic growth, the reign of Jiang 
Zemin is also well-known for a significant innovation: the invitation of private 
entrepreneurs and businesspeople to join the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (it 
should be acknowledged that some private entrepreneurs were already Party 
members, but Jiang legitimised this phenomenon72). Rather than appearing as a 
contradiction with the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, 
which traditionally prescribed the Party to be the vanguard of the proletariat, this new 
policy was cleverly encompassed by Jiang’s own ideological addition to Chinese 
political doctrine, the theory of Three Represents. The Three Represents theory states 
that the Chinese Communist Party represents advanced productive forces, advanced 
culture, and the interests of the bulk of the population.
73
 While the addition of the 
Three Represents to the official ideological canon was not an economic policy, it 
overtly indicated a fact that the people were already well aware of: the Chinese 
government was no longer the champion of the ordinary worker and peasant alone, 
but also of the wealthy tycoon. It highlights the Party’s belief that these successful 
entrepreneurs and a large private sector are necessary for the development of the 
‘advanced productive forces’. Fewsmith comments on this new development: “It 
seems natural that a post-revolutionary political elite would try to cope with the 
proliferation of societal interests by seeking to incorporate them in the ideological 
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system”.
74
 In other words, the inclusion of elite businessmen into the Party was an 
official recognition that Chinese society had progressed from being a nation of needy 
workers and peasants into a more diverse – as well as polarised – society of which the 
talented, the privileged and the well-connected were an integral component. It 
demonstrates the third generation of leadership’s effort to diversify the CCP and 
revolutionise its image to that of a Party embracing all sectors of society. 
Were there other motives for welcoming private entrepreneurs into the CCP? 
Part of the answer lies in the Party’s endeavours to preserve the strength of its reign. 
As long as it remained the vanguard of the proletariat alone, the CCP had little to 
offer the nouveau riche, and so it needed to find a way to integrate them in order to 
gain their support. According to Dong Ming, reaching out to this socio-economic 
class is strategic in preventing open challenges to the current political regime because 
it will help to resolve conflicts within the existing political system and also to adapt 
members’ political attitudes to official political discourses.75  
Has the invitation of private entrepreneurs into the Party had an impact on 
inequality? Perhaps not directly, but it does serve as a reminder of the decidedly 
distinct socioeconomic strata in contemporary Chinese society. Yongnian Zheng, who 
is a professor and the Head of Research at the University of Nottingham China Policy 
Institute, succinctly remarks that “to accommodate the newly-rising social classes 
does not mean that the interests of workers and peasants can be ignored”.
76
 The lack 
of focus on these latter groups during the Jiang era explains the desperate need at the 
change of leadership at the 16th Party Congress for a new focus on building up the 
rural areas. The inclusion of private entrepreneurs in the CCP may serve to widen the 
Party’s power base from one standpoint, but if it does not quickly act, the Party will 
also be in danger of losing the support of another crucial social stratum: the peasantry. 
Jiang’s era did see one attempt at reducing inequality by launching the project 
of ‘Opening Up the West,’ or ‘Go West’, initiated by former premier Zhu Rongji 
around 1998 and 1999.77 The National People’s Congress then made a decision in 
2000 to shift the focus of China’s economic development to the more backward 
western regions, which was also intended to increase domestic consumption, enhance 
environmental protection, reduce social unrest, and mitigate the potential negative 
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effects of China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation.
78
 This large-scale 
project mainly involved funnelling money into development projects in China’s ethnic 
autonomous regions – projects such as major highways, railways, and gas and power 
transmission projects.
79
 Despite this effort to develop the western regions, however, 
the vast disparity between the east and west had not decreased very much by the year 
2005, leaving the task to Hu’s administration to continue.80 Furthermore, this project 
was not aimed exclusively at building up rural regions, but the western cities as well. 
When it came to rural matters, Jiang’s era, like the second part of Deng’s reign, was 
primarily a time of negligence. Even Zhu Rongji admitted at the 2002 NPC that the 
biggest shortcoming of his administration was in the area of improving life for 
China’s farmers.81  
An important question to ask is how Deng and Jiang justified their general 
neglect of the countryside in the last decade and a half of the twentieth century. One 
answer is that this was done in the name of national economic development. Because 
of the extent to which China was lagging behind when it emerged from the Maoist 
era, economic growth needed to be pursued, and pursued it was, no matter what the 
social consequence. In order to make this appear legitimate, numerous intellectuals, 
when called towards the end of the 1980s to develop an ideological justification for 
the use of market economic principles to develop the country, resurrected Deng’s 
1956 thesis that “the main contradiction in Chinese society was between its “advanced 
socialist system” and “backward productive forces”.
82
 This also rationalised the 
introduction of privatised forms of ownership, as well as the favouring of the eastern 
urban areas over the rural inland regions under the Open Door Policy.  
Another way in which Deng and Jiang legitimised their policies was in the 
changing definition of socialism. Meisner points out that during Deng’s time, “As 
originally conceived, the means of modern economic development were to serve 
eventual socialist ends, but as time went on socialism itself was defined as economic 
progress, pure and simple”.83 China’s leaders made clear that the end goal they were 
pursuing was not capitalism, which would entail that “production is for the sake of 
production” in order to benefit capitalists. Rather, under socialism they were using 
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capitalistic measures to work toward economic development in order to meet the 
needs of China’s people.
84
 Despite the withdrawal from socialist principles such as 
egalitarianism and class struggle, the use of the words ‘socialist’ and ‘socialism’ 
continued to thrive in politics and economics. Meisner writes that the Fourteenth 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party allowed for a dramatic increase in the use 
of capitalist measures for the sake of speeding up economic growth, but rather than 
hailing the arrival of capitalism in China along with the market economic system, the 
new economic scheme was labelled a ‘socialist market economic system’. He muses 
that, “For inventing this oxymoron, Deng was extravagantly praised for making yet 
another “great theoretical breakthrough” in the development of “Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Zedong Thought,” which incongruously remained the title of official state 
ideology”.85  
 
Hu’s era 
 
The Hu era, which is the current era at the time of writing, has marked a change in 
policy in order to address the problem of rural-urban inequality. While inequality was 
never desired during earlier generations of leadership – even though it was allowed to 
increase – the Hu-Wen leadership (the combined leadership of President Hu Jintao 
and Premier Wen Jiabao) is the first that is seriously proactive about tackling this 
problem. As a result, recent policy is more focused on social justice, equality, and 
sustainable development.86 Early in the reign of Hu’s government, leaders recognised 
the crucial need to pay attention to the countryside. China’s rural issues are often 
referred to as the sannong wenti, or the ‘three rural problems’: nongmin (peasants), 
nongye (agriculture), and nongcun (countryside). This new era contrasts with the late 
Deng and Jiang eras, which turned out to be a get-rich-quick regime for a minority of 
the population. 
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A new policy direction 
 
The new direction in policy was officially unveiled in the 11
th
 Five-Year Plan – also 
called the 11
th
 Five-Year Guidelines for National Economic and Social Development. 
The Plan, which spans the years 2006 to 2010, began to be drafted in 2003,
87
 while 
the proposal for the Plan was adopted in October 2005.88 The main catch-phrases of 
the 11th Five-Year Plan are the ideas of ‘Building a Harmonious Socialist Society’ and 
the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’, which can be seen as all-inclusive labels for 
the new policy emphases on social needs and sustainable development rather than on 
the exclusive goal of rapid GDP growth. But why the desperate need for a shift in 
policy? 
Firstly, China’s wealth is still extremely unevenly distributed. At Hu’s coming 
to power, the countryside continued to lag behind in terms of income – in particular 
the inland regions. In these regions, agriculture is still the predominant activity. For 
example, at the time of writing in 1996, Rozelle states that in central regions, 
agriculture makes up more than 50 percent of the gross rural output, while in western 
regions the figure is more than 65 percent. These inland areas are considerably less 
prosperous than the eastern coastal regions, where rural industry has expanded 
greatly.
89
 Thus the smallest proportion of rural residents is earning the lion’s share of 
the income due to the nature of the activity that these residents are involved in. It is 
also difficult for farmers to earn an income comparable to that of someone residing in 
a city. The figures portraying the extent of inequality are staggering. Official Chinese 
statistics claim that in 2005, the per capita disposable household income in urban 
areas was 10,493 yuan, while the figure for rural areas was 3,255 yuan. While 
incomes are increasing in both urban and rural areas, the rate of growth in urban areas 
is significantly faster. The real increase from 2004 to 2005 for urban households was 
9.6 per cent, while in rural areas it was only 6.2 per cent.90 Based on figures from the 
2006 China Statistical Yearbook, it can be seen that from 1985 to 2005, per capita net 
income for urban households increased 14.20 times (from 739.1 to 10,493 yuan), 
while for rural households the increase was only 8.19 times (from 397.6 to 3,254.9 
yuan). Although the increase in rural income is encouraging, and while differences in 
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living expenses between rural and urban areas should be taken into account, these 
figures indicate that the rural-urban gap is still widening. While some scholars believe 
that income inequality is an inevitable cost of economic growth and is a common 
phenomenon in developing countries, others believe that China has become too 
polarised for its current level of national development.
91
 It is evident from the policy 
shift toward social justice that China’s leaders are also convinced that the vast 
disparities can no longer be defended in the name of economic growth. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, rural-urban inequality is not only limited to 
income, but also applies to education and health care as well. The vast differences 
between educational opportunities in the cities and those in the countryside urgently 
need to be reduced. A more efficient and affordable health care programme is 
required for the huge numbers of rural residents, many of whom have suffered 
because they could not afford to see a doctor or purchase medicine.  
The deficient technological level of the agricultural industry and the 
consequent low rate of production constitute a second reason for the backwardness of 
the countryside and thus the need for change. This issue affects the nation’s livelihood 
as a whole, since food production needs to increase in proportion to China’s massive 
population. The government has recognised the need to invest more resources in 
agriculture in order to lift the productivity and quality of agricultural products and so 
stimulate the rural economy in keeping with the rest of the country.  
Not only are there shortcomings in agriculture, but labour productivity is also 
extremely low – a problem amplified by the millions of surplus rural labourers. Colin 
Carter cites Bhattacharyya and Parker’s claim that agriculture’s average labour 
productivity is not even one fifth of that of industry. 92 In short, being a farmer in 
China does not pay well, and it does not earn very much in proportion to labour 
inputs. This is mostly due to an increasing agricultural labour force working a 
constant or decreasing area of farmland,93 and also because the prices for agricultural 
products are low.94 While not all rural dwellers are involved in agriculture – on the 
contrary, for many, township based industry is the primary economic activity – rural 
income remains much lower than urban income.  
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The new policy shift also incorporates an ideological aspect. As mentioned 
above, one of the main catchphrases of the 11
th
 Five-Year plan is ‘Building a 
Harmonious Socialist Society’, which is intended to be achieved by using the 
approach of the ‘Scientific Outlook on Development’. This latter phrase means an 
increase in the quality of China’s labour, production and technological advances, 
rather than relying on growth through means such as cheap labour.95 Zheng and Tok 
write that this theme of Hu’s policy package is likely to become Hu Jintao’s 
ideological legacy in years to come, in contrast to Jiang’s goal of building a xiaokang 
shehui by 2020.96  
What is the purpose of establishing an ideological legacy? First and foremost, 
it is traditional to communist China. In past generations of leadership of the PRC, 
each paramount leader has established such a legacy. Mao Zedong Thought is still 
revered and studied in contemporary China. Deng was the author of ‘Deng Xiaoping 
Theory’. Jiang Zemin is known for his ‘Three Represents,’ a concept to which Hu 
continues to refer in his reports. As Joseph Fewsmith observes, “The supreme leader 
inevitably has put his stamp on the ideology to define a “line” that is both personal 
and organizational. This is how a leader in the PRC defines his leadership, and it is 
why the ideological portfolio is always the ultimate responsibility of the leader”.
97
 An 
example of the progression of ideology can be seen in Hu’s report at the First Plenary 
Session of the 17
th
 Party Congress, where he lists his concept of the ‘Scientific 
Outlook on Development’ along with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, 
Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the Three Represents.98 Zheng and Tok suggest that Hu 
Jintao is “engraving his [own] mark on the history of the history of the Chinese 
Communist Party” and that a potential ‘Hu Jintao Theory’ will be his “contribution to 
the Chinese version of Marxism”, which will include the ideas of ‘scientific 
development’ and ‘harmonious society’.
99
 It seems that each leader must leave his 
mark, lest he fade into oblivion once his term as top leader is over, and Hu is no 
exception to this rule. This ideological contribution will provide legitimacy for his 
current position as Number One leader and will most likely help Hu gather greater 
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support for his second term.
100
 In the past, leaders such as Mao and Deng had already 
achieved a certain amount of power, respect and personal support due to their 
previous revolutionary experience and their vast network of support when they 
attained the top post. Like Jiang, Hu has had to engineer much of his support since his 
accession to office. This process of gathering support began before his attainment of 
the Chinese leadership’s top post. Even though Hu was Jiang’s designated successor, 
the relationship between the two was “uneasy” and Hu could not count on Jiang’s 
backing as proof of his legitimacy as Party boss.101 Lam writes that Hu “assembled a 
formidable power network in the run-up to the Sixteenth Party Congress”; many of 
these were Hu’s former China Youth League colleagues.102 Zheng points out that the 
11th five-year plan (which incorporates the idea of a New Socialist Countryside) is the 
first major policy initiative for the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership, since they did 
not have full control over policy decisions until Jiang Zemin stepped down from his 
post as the Chairman of the Military Commission in 2004.103 The departure of Jiang 
has given Hu an opportunity to consolidate political power and affirm his position as a 
leader by introducing such policies as Building a New Socialist Countryside and 
Building a Harmonious Society. Zheng and Tok maintain that Hu needs to promptly 
initiate these changes to the Party and to China in order to be assured of leaving a 
good ideological legacy, since he is expected to step down from the posts of CCP 
Party secretary and State President in 2012, by which time he will have served two 
terms.
104
 If the changes are successful, Hu will be remembered for his efforts to 
develop and clean up China’s countryside. 
While Jiang’s ideological trademark – the Three Represents theory – 
broadened the Party’s power base by including private entrepreneurs in the Party, 
Hu’s variety of ideology attempts to reassure China’s less privileged classes that the 
Party is still concerned for their livelihood and opinions. This is important because for 
China’s leaders to ignore these classes means to risk China’s national stability. Lewis 
and Xue have identified five main social strata which pose the biggest danger to 
China’s national stability: the peasants, urban workers, minority religious groups, 
demobilised soldiers, and certain intellectuals. Of these five, Lewis and Xue write that 
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the peasants have so far presented the greatest threat to social stability.
105
 The new 
policy shift seeks to reduce this threat.  
Inequality and social stability are undoubtedly linked. The vast inequality 
between the countryside and the cities is no longer viable in a state founded on the 
principle of societal equality. Oi writes that “After a decade of transition, by the 
1990s, the “trickle-down” theory underlying Deng’s policy of “let some get rich first” 
has come under increasing question as those who have fallen behind in the first phase 
of reform became anxious and those who have failed to benefit lose patience”.106 
Fewsmith points out that the existing “regional gaps increase the sense of social 
injustice that feeds much of the frustration with current economic trends”.107 This 
indicates that stability is a key factor determining the need for tackling the inequality 
problem. 
Indeed, Chinese people today may be more prone to questioning the current 
regime than ever before. It is likely that some Chinese citizens, particularly those in 
rural areas who have been feeling the brunt of the inequality, have become 
disillusioned with the long-term neglect from the government towards their situation. 
In the past, the uninhibited increase in inequality was brushed over with clever 
justifications from China’s leaders. As has been previously mentioned, Deng 
Xiaoping, anticipating the growth of inequality, provided a justification in advance for 
this phenomenon, proclaiming that “some must get rich first” when he began to 
introduce elements of a market economic system and open up the country to foreign 
investment. Today, the principal of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ 
essentially serves as an umbrella under which can be incorporated economic measures 
and political formulæ which conflict with traditional socialist tenets. But this may no 
longer be enough to appease the masses. Suisheng Zhao succinctly remarks on current 
ideology in the eyes of the people: 
 
Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as the official ideology no 
longer provides convincing arguments of the need for the general 
public to preserve communist one-party rule. Nor does it explain how 
the socialist market economy that the Party has claimed to be building 
in China is different from, or superior to, the capitalism it once 
opposed.108 
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In the past, official ideology and policy were widely propagated as a means of 
legitimising the Party’s rule. However, this strategy is becoming less and less 
effective. In order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people, the government 
must now take new measures to make a more equal society. According to Zheng, “As 
ideological dogma becomes less convincing, the sustainability of the CCP regime will 
now have to depend on an institutionalized, and thus reliable, governance structure, 
legitimated in one way or another”.
109
 While the policy shift of Hu’s government does 
not essentially involve reform of the governance structure, as Zheng suggests is 
necessary, it does mark a change in the principles guiding policy makers, which may 
for the moment help the government to maintain popular support.  
 What does Hu’s government hope to achieve by the new policy emphasis? The 
main strategy established under the Hu government to take care of the sannong wenti 
is a new rural development programme entitled ‘Building a New Socialist 
Countryside.’ The aim of Building a New Socialist Countryside is to level the playing 
field, so to speak, between the cities and the countryside, by addressing the many 
inequalities that exist between the countryside and the cities. Building a New Socialist 
Countryside is linked to Hu’s ideological legacy of Building a Harmonious Socialist 
Society because of the two programmes’ common goal of social justice and 
sustainable development. In this way, the new rural development programme can be 
seen as a label for a series of concrete goals to be implemented in order to fulfil the 
ideological goal of Building a Harmonious Society in rural areas.  
 
Building a New Socialist Countryside 
 
Building a New Socialist Countryside is not the first attempt to reduce the level of 
inequality between the east coast and China’s inland and western hinterlands. As 
mentioned before, around the turn of the millennium Jiang’s administration initiated a 
strategy to develop China’s western regions. This strategy had similar goals, but a 
different approach. The outstanding difference between these two projects is that 
Building a New Socialist Countryside focuses on rural issues throughout China, while 
the former plan aimed to develop the western regions in general, without specific 
focus on rural areas. The continued need for a rural development programme indicates 
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that previous endeavours were not as successful as had been hoped, and that 
development is not an overnight process. 
Building a New Socialist Countryside is being implemented under the premise 
that the conditions now exist in China for urban areas to support rural areas. That is, 
the recent economic boom, from which the cities have been the main beneficiaries, 
has created the necessary conditions for supporting rural development. Fiscal revenue 
and fixed asset investment all more than doubled during the 10th Five-Year Plan 
period (2001-2005). China’s GDP in 2005 was equivalent to US $2.25 trillion, 
compared to the figure of only US $162 billion in the year 2000.110 Under these 
conditions, China’s leaders have decided that the countryside should no longer have 
to sustain urban development; the old pattern has been turned upside-down. It is the 
cities that will provide the necessary funds for the development of agriculture and for 
increased investment in rural infrastructure, education and health care. This is indeed 
a monumental change in Chinese history, for China, having been an agricultural-
based economy for so many centuries, has always relied on the countryside for 
supporting urban life and society.  
The government has mapped out some of the blueprints to give tangible 
evidence of its plan to invest in the countryside. Concrete goals of Building a New 
Socialist Countryside include increased investment in agriculture, the abolition of the 
agricultural tax, increased investment in rural education and health care, and the 
encouragement of domestic consumption in the countryside. 
As mentioned before, the underdevelopment of agriculture is one of the chief 
reasons for the rural-urban gap. Under Building a New Socialist Countryside, the 
budget allocation for agriculture was reported to increase 14.2 per cent in 2006, in 
addition to subsidies toward grain production, high quality seed and agricultural 
machinery. Major grain production counties were to receive additional incentives. A 
key goal of developing agriculture is to improve land and labour productivity, which 
as mentioned above are both at considerably low levels, and desperately need 
addressing in order to give the countryside and economic face-lift, since, as Riskin, 
Zhao and Li state, “Land and labor are the two production forces shaping the rural 
economy”.111 Rather than encouraging peasants to turn away from agricultural 
activities because of the current low productivity of this sector, Building a New 
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Socialist Countryside seeks to develop agriculture through the application of science 
and technology, and to increase its productivity and in turn raise farmers’ incomes so 
that they can continue to farm. The land must become more fruitful, and more 
advanced techniques need to be applied to it by the labour force, which in turn must 
become more skilled through vocational training and education. Building a New 
Socialist Countryside seeks to accomplish these goals by improving agricultural 
techniques and by implementing more modern technology in these areas. If those 
involved in various development projects can help to fertilise underproductive soil, 
irrigate dry soil, reduce erosion, improve seed quality and provide farm equipment 
that can increase production in these low quality land areas, then perhaps the standard 
of living of these poor households can be raised.   
Secondly, the agricultural tax was completely removed on 1 January 2006.112 
Peasants have long been under the burden of heavy taxes. A recent government 
statement declares that in the past farmers have had to pay 33.6 billion yuan worth of 
agricultural tax and more than 70 billion yuan for other fees113 (this figure is 
presumably an annual figure). Building a New Socialist Countryside has relieved 
farmers from this tax burden. The new emphasis on developing the countryside has 
meant the abolition of agricultural tax for the first time in more than 2,600 years, a 
fact that the Chinese government widely publicises. Rather than deriving their 
revenue from taxes, local governments will receive fiscal transfers as subsidies from 
the central government in the New Socialist Countryside. 
Thirdly, the current government is pouring more funding into rural education 
and health care. This is not the first post-Mao attempt to help poverty-stricken 
children attend school. Project Hope, a non-governmental project sponsored by the 
Communist Youth League and the China Youth Development Foundation, was set up 
in 1989 to enable rural children to return to school.114 In addition, the government 
expenditure on compulsory education for rural areas increased by 72 per cent from 
2003 to 2004; this amounted to about ten billion yuan.115 However, Building a New 
Socialist Countryside represents a continued effort on behalf of the central 
government to improve the quality and accessibility of rural education. The increase 
in central government funds for compulsory education in the countryside is to 
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increase by 218.2 billion yuan over the five years following 2006.
116
 Premier Wen set 
a goal that 85 percent of all regions in western China should have access to free 
education, and that the youth illiteracy rate should drop to 5 percent by 2007.
117
  
In terms of rural health care, until recently, government expenditure in this 
sector had been minimal. In 2005 Health Minister Gao Qiang commented that a mere 
20 percent of resources, including medical funds, were spent in China’s rural areas.118 
In order to ameliorate this situation, a rural cooperative health care system is being 
implemented, in which rural residents pay a small amount per year into an individual 
account, while the government – actually a joint effort by central and local 
governments at all levels – pays a considerably larger amount into the same account. 
This has begun on an experimental basis,119 and by the end of 2006, approximately 
half of the nation’s rural population had joined the scheme, according to official 
figures.120 The central government hopes that all rural residents will be covered by the 
system by the end of 2010. At the same time, additional investment is being 
contributed to the building and upgrading of health clinics in the countryside, as well 
as a transfer of a number of doctors from the cities to the rural areas.121  
A fourth aspect of Building a New Socialist Countryside is its aim to increase 
domestic consumption in the countryside rather than continuing to rely on fixed 
interest investment for economic growth. In this way, China’s leaders hope to 
stimulate the rural economy. A product of the Fourth Session of the 10
th
 National 
People’s Congress, the Report on China’s Economic and Social Development Plan 
mentioned that the speed of growth of fixed interest investment, while slightly slower 
than in the previous year, was still 25.7 percent in 2005 – a figure considered too 
high.122  
Why do China’s leaders place so much importance on encouraging domestic 
consumption in the countryside? According to Lan Haitao, who is an expert from the 
Macroeconomics Research Academy under the State Development and Reform 
Commission, increasing domestic consumption is a feature of rural development that 
cannot be compromised. He believes that "The rural market is the stabilizer of China's 
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economy in the future".
123
 Not only this, but as Li Cheng points out, “Chinese leaders 
… believe that, unless consumer demand increases in various parts of China – both 
inland and on the coast, in both rural and urban areas – China cannot reasonably claim 
to be the largest consumer market in the world”.
124
 This fact may have serious 
implications for China’s foreign trade. 
China’s rural population numbers several hundred million – a potentially 
colossal domestic market. Yet even in 2005, Chen asserts, only 32.9 per cent of total 
retail sales in China were in rural areas. This leaves 67.1 per cent of sales in urban 
areas, where less than half of the population resides. According to World Bank 
statistics in 2006 (as reported by the BBC), the richest 10 per cent of China’s people 
were responsible for 33.1 per cent of consumption, whereas the poorest 10 per cent 
took up a mere 1.8 per cent of consumption.125 
As it is, China is in need of increasing overall domestic consumption rather 
than relying heavily on fixed asset investment to fuel its economic growth. In 2005 
domestic consumption made up only 33 percent of economic growth for the year, 
while the bulk of growth came from export trade and overseas investment.126 
Domestic consumption has surged in recent years, although this is a primarily urban 
phenomenon. In May 2007, an increase of 15.9 per cent in retail sales in China was 
recorded for the preceding year.
127
 If the government is successful in increasing 
domestic consumption in the countryside, the whole country will benefit. It will help 
China’s growth to remain sustainable, and also help to reduce the imbalance in trade 
surpluses caused by China’s export and investment-based growth.128  
One New Socialist Countryside project that is currently underway is the 
Project of Village Markets in Tens of Thousands, which is being promoted by China’s 
Ministry of Commerce. By planting 250,000 village markets in key locations, the 
government hopes to create a market supply chain for town and village markets to 
support the city markets and so reduce the gap between urban and rural 
consumption.129 It remains to be seen, however, if these strategies for increasing 
consumption will be successful. Increasing farmers’ incomes and improving social 
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security may be an encouragement for them to spend more, yet farmers are likely to 
be slow in increasing their consumption until they are convinced that their livelihood 
is changing for good and that they can count on sustained increases in income. 
In addition to the strategies mentioned above, village and county 
administrative, educational and fiscal systems are undergoing reform to make rural 
finances more efficient.130 This will help local governments be able to function 
without the need to charge additional fees and levies to farmers; this situation has 
until the present contributed not only to farmers’ poor finances but also to the level of 
discontent in the countryside. This idea will be further developed in Chapter 3, 
however. 
 
Will Hu’s government be successful? 
 
How successful is Building a New Socialist Countryside likely to be in reducing 
rural-urban inequality? Given China’s rapid economic growth over the past two to 
three decades, the financial conditions for initiating this rural development 
programme have certainly been reached. However, there are a number of potential 
impediments to the programme’s success.  
A primary concern is the reliability of local officials. Although China is much 
better off economically than in previous decades, and may be ready to pour large 
amounts of investment into the countryside, a vital question to consider is how 
effective the channelling of money and investments of other resources will be. If 
corrupt officials continue to hold positions of power throughout the countryside, the 
fiscal transfers may do little good. Thus the effectiveness of Building a New Socialist 
Countryside also depends on the Hu-Wen administration’s ability to fight corruption 
in the CCP and in the government, and on its ability to improve local officials’ 
inefficiency and reduce their resistance in implementing central government 
mandates. This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 3. 
A second concern is that social justice is a difficult goal to reach in a time 
when China is still experiencing rapid economic growth, even though the current 
government aims at increasing the sustainability of this growth. China’s GDP growth 
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rate in 2005 was estimated to still be as high as 9.4 percent.
131
 Zheng remarks that 
“According to the (11
th
 Five-Year) plan, the ruling party will seek to accomplish 
concurrently two seemingly contradictory goals, that is, high growth and social 
justice”.
132
 These two goals are not completely contradictory, since economic growth 
is merely a means of achieving economic development, which may help to bring 
about increase in economic equality. However, while the government may be able to 
achieve both of these ambitions, social justice will only be attained if economic 
growth is sustainable and if it results in economic development. The current 
government does recognise the difference between economic growth and economic 
development, and is eager to see the latter advancing in China through the 
implementation of the 11th Five-Year Guidelines.133  
Thirdly, it must be recognised that even if Hu’s government is successful in 
revitalising the countryside, progress should not be expected to be achieved overnight. 
In a speech given in February 2006, Chen Xiwen, Deputy Director of the Office of the 
Central Financial Work Leading Group, stated that Building a New Socialist 
Countryside is both a “long term goal” and an “immediate task”.134 He acknowledges, 
“it will take a long time in history for the socialist countryside to materialize in 
China.”
135
 For example, it is an expensive and time-consuming process to invest in 
new technology and training for farmers in order to achieve the modernisation of 
agriculture. Such impediments add weight to the urgency of the task. 
Another final important question to ask is whether the current government’s 
response to the problem of rural-urban inequality will be successful in maintaining the 
CCP’s legitimacy in the eyes of China’s people. This study argues that while 
increasing equality and improving the living conditions of China’s rural citizens is 
likely to increase their contentment with the current political order to a certain degree, 
there are a number of other reasons why this social stratum may continue to be 
disillusioned with the nation’s leadership. Yang writes that “The lean time has 
magnified the political implications of excessive government burdens on farmers and 
sparked numerous protests directed at local authorities.”136 The key word here is 
magnified, implying that the relative neediness of China’s rural citizens is merely one 
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reason for them to be discontent, and this reason adds to the weight of these other 
sources of discontent. As Yang has pointed out, one of the key reasons for peasants’ 
discontent is their deteriorating relationship with their local leaders. This relationship 
cannot be repaired by merely raising the farmers’ standard of living. Deeper reforms 
are needed in the realm of the political and administrative systems. This theme will be 
further developed in Chapter 3.  
The peasants have been disadvantaged throughout the history of the People’s 
Republic. During the first era of Party rule, the peasants were exploited and deprived 
of many benefits available to urban residents, although the Party continued to 
propagate the idea of egalitarianism. During the early reform era, peasants began to 
prosper as farming once again became a household affair, and was released from the 
straight-jacket of a rigidly planned economy. Following these early agrarian reforms, 
however, the focus of reform shifted to the urban area, to the detriment of the 
countryside. The ruthless pursuit of GDP growth under Deng and Jiang left the 
countryside lagging far behind the cities. The Party under Hu has inherited the 
colossal task of addressing the rural-urban gap. China’s leaders acknowledge that 
reducing the urban-rural gap will be a long-term task. While time may bring success 
to Hu’s policies in the endeavour to make Chinese society more equal, it remains to 
be seen if this will serve to ensure the preservation of Communist Party rule.  
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Chapter 2 
Migration to the Cities 
 
The previous chapter briefly traced the evolution of rural-urban inequality in China, 
then examined in detail the Chinese Communist Party’s current attempts to deal with 
the problem. This chapter will adopt a similar approach in considering the issue of 
rural-urban migration. It will first outline the history of migration from the 
countryside to the cities since 1949, then it will focus on the current situation and the 
Party’s response to it. Like Chapter 1, this chapter seeks to analyse to what extent this 
issue affects the sustainability of Communist Party rule in China. 
 
Mao’s Era 
 
Throughout most of the Maoist era, the hukou system − or household registration 
system − restricted the travel of rural residents from the countryside to the cities, so 
there was a very rigid divide between rural and urban areas. Zai Liang classifies 
migration policy during Mao’s reign into three stages: the years 1951 to 1960, when 
rural-urban migration was comparatively loosely controlled and fairly rapid; the 
period between 1961 and 1965, when rural-urban migration policies were strictly 
enforced; and the years 1966 to 1977, when rural-urban migration was almost unheard 
of, and instead urban-rural migration occurred frequently as many intellectuals and 
youths were sent down to the countryside to become ‘rustified’.137  
While Liang’s categorisation is useful, I propose to adopt the more fine-
grained and recent five-stage categorisation suggested by Solinger.138 The first stage 
is the early 1950s, a time of relatively free movement. During this period, population 
movement was relatively unrestricted, and peasant migration to and from the cities 
was guaranteed as a right by the 1954 constitution.
139
  At first the hukou system was 
more of a way of monitoring the people rather than a tool of control. Each household 
had a hukou booklet, which contained information such as the family’s origin, class 
affiliation, personal identity, birth date, as well as the occupation of each member of 
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the family.
140
 This information, however, was not used to restrict movement between 
the rural areas and cities, and during the First Five-Year Plan (1953 - 1957) urban 
industrial jobs opened up and attracted multitudes of rural workers. Thomas Bernstein 
writes that in 1954, close to two and a half million people were hired in cities, up to 
seventy percent of them peasants.
141
   
The second stage coincides with the First Five-Year Plan, from 1953 to 1957. 
During this time, many peasants were recruited to cities in order to keep up with 
industrial production quotas while minimising labour costs. However, towards the end 
of the First Five-Year Plan, China’s leaders began to fear that the rate of rural-urban 
migration would not be sustainable. Thus during this second stage of migration, the 
movement from the countryside to towns and cities began to be much more tightly 
controlled as the central government began restricting other employment of rural 
workers in towns and cities. The hukou system was used as early as the mid-1950s to 
control the flow of peasants flooding into urban areas. In 1956 Zhou Enlai issued an 
“Order to Stop Blind Rural Migration”, stopping the flow of rural labour to mines, 
factories, construction and transportation companies, railways, and other sources of 
urban employment.
142
 A “labor contract system” was born at the end of 1957 to keep 
the hiring of rural labourers under control.
143
 The first hukou legislation was instituted 
in 1958.
144
  
The third period was the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1960, when urban 
enterprises once again began “hiring wildly”.
145
 The hukou legislation and other 
directives issued to control migration were virtually ignored during this time. Urban 
enterprises actively recruited rural workers and the migration rate leaped up.146 It 
would be a mistake to see this relaxation of immigration policy as a sign of a new 
leniency towards the peasants. Those who remained in the countryside were driven to 
work harder than ever before, as were those who went to the cities. Indeed, Solinger 
notes that the era of the Great Leap Forward “constituted the very clearest instance of 
the state and its local enterprises acting in unison to exploit that reserve army of 
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peasants that the registration policies of the state had created”.
147
 What is more, 
following that disastrous campaign, the hukou system was once again rigidly 
enforced, limiting the peasants’ means of livelihood and denying them freedom of 
mobility.  
The fourth period constitutes the two years following the collapse of the Great 
Leap Forward, 1961 to 1962, when the real crackdown on migration began. Huge 
numbers of rural residents were sent back to the countryside after having worked in 
the urban industrialisation drive. Estimates of the actual number of those deported 
vary between scholars. John P. Emerson puts the number of those sent back to the 
countryside at 20 million in 1961 and 30 million in 1962.148 Chan figures that around 
18 million rural people who had been working in urban industry were sent back to 
their villages in the countryside between 1961 and 1963.149 It is certain, however, that 
peasants were removed from towns and cities in massive numbers, and that rural-
urban migration during this period was extremely restricted.  
Finally, in the fifth stage, from 1962 to 1976, population movement was in 
general still tightly restricted, although the use of short-term peasant labour continued 
after the 1961 – 1963 deportation period.
150
 Bernstein points out that the hiring of 
peasants would have been attractive to urban enterprises since rural workers were 
presumably cheaper labourers to acquire than city folk.
151
 During one stage of the 
Cultural Revolution – from 1968 and onward – a number of peasants were sent to 
work in factories (some in urban places, some in remote regions), and millions of 
urban youth and Party cadres were ‘sent down’ to the countryside to ‘learn from the 
peasants.’ Net rural-urban migration was, as a result of this exchange, almost nil.152 It 
is important to point out that during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, from 
1966 to mid-1968, centralised control of the nation broke down as Mao sought to 
mobilise the masses against the Party, and this was significantly different in terms of 
migration policy from the subsequent period of ‘sending down’. In light of this, 
Solinger’s fifth stage of migration is not entirely accurate as the period 1962 to 1976 
was not a time of consistent migration policy. It is notable, however, that during the 
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Cultural Revolution, the urban population fell to 17 per cent of the total population – 
down from about 20 percent in 1960.
153
  
It can be seen that during the Maoist era, rural-urban migration policy 
fluctuated between periods of tight restriction and times of loosening up. Solinger 
writes that “State regulation of migration in the Mao years did not take the form of a 
blanket prohibition. Instead, denial of access alternated with a few periods when in-
migration to cities was permitted, others when it was even actively encouraged”.154 
Thus it should not be inferred that rural-urban migration was without exception never 
allowed after the First Five-Year Plan period, only that in most cases it was extremely 
difficult because of the strict rules relating to changing one’s residence and 
employment status, and because the danwei system in the cities barred peasants with 
agricultural hukou from accessing basic living necessities. There did exist ways and 
means of converting one’s hukou from agricultural to non-agricultural (this essentially 
meant to change from a rural to an urban status), although the conversion rate fell 
significantly over time. When the hukou system was first used to control population 
mobility in the second half of the 1950s, hukou conversion was relatively common – 
on average close to 4 percent of the population converted their hukou to urban status 
each year. However, by 1959 there were fewer and fewer conversions as the 
government cracked down on rural-urban migration, and by the early 1960s, 
government policy limited hukou conversion and migration so strictly that the hukou 
conversion rate fell to less than 1 percent.
155
 
What is more, members of the peasantry who did work in cities as migrants 
during Mao’s time were treated as a labour reserve, and were “made to serve the ends 
either of the national state or of its enterprises in the localities”.156 This set the 
foundation for the exploitation of and discrimination against peasant migrants that 
was to continue even throughout the reform era. 
What were the state’s reasons for inhibiting peasants from moving to the 
cities? The majority of explanations for the use of the hukou system mention that it 
was instituted because of the need to separate agriculture from industry and 
countryside from city. This is because in the early days of the People’s Republic, the 
heavy industrial sector was favoured as it was intended to be China’s path to 
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modernisation. The industrial labour force was thus cared for by means of an 
extensive social benefit system (from which the entire peasantry was excluded). 
Towards the mid to late 1950s, the government decided that too many ‘blind flows’ of 
migration were taking place and that the cities were suffering under the burden of 
excess labourers.
157
 In order to prevent the urban industrial sector from being 
swamped by peasants seeking social benefits and employment, the state set up the 
hukou system, which worked together with the danwei system to control population 
mobility and distribution and to keep the agricultural and industrial labour forces 
separate.158   
 Secondly, Chan and Zhang point out that the hukou system was also an 
effective way of maintaining social and political order.159 During the Maoist era, the 
daily lives of even the most ordinary of peasants were highly politicised, and the Party 
was always on the lookout for its alleged political enemies – those it considered 
counterrevolutionary, rightist, bourgeois, traitors, and politically backward. This was 
particularly true during the numerous large-scale political campaigns of the time. By 
keeping peasants’ mobility limited, as well as by requiring peasants’ participation in 
political small groups and other political meetings, the Party was able to monitor 
individuals’ behaviour and speech easily. 
How did the central government justify the limitation of the peasants’ 
mobility? It voiced concern about the inability of agriculture to meet the grain output 
needed for the growing urban population.
160
 It is true that China’s overall population 
grew dramatically during the pre-reform Communist era: in 1949 the figure was 542 
million, and by 1974 − a mere 25 years later − it had risen to 900 million.161 This was 
an ever growing number of mouths to feed, and as China was determined to be 
completely self-sufficient in terms of food production, the government emphasised 
the critical need to have enough farmers available to work the land. It is clear, 
however, that surplus rural labour actually existed during Mao’s time, indicating that 
the grain argument was no more than propaganda used to justify the hukou system. 
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According to a survey by Taylor, most studies estimate the figure for surplus labour 
during the era of the communes to be about 30%.
162
 
 As a result of the hukou system, peasants’ lives were tightly controlled. Since 
they had to obtain special permission from the authorities to change their hukou 
residence or status, migration without official consent was virtually unheard of and 
the Party was able to keep a close eye on every person. At the same time as keeping 
track of citizens’ residence, the state was also able to control peasants’ mobility and 
so make it very difficult for non-urbanites to live in the cities.163 In fact, not only did 
peasants need permission to migrate, but also to travel or visit friends or relatives in a 
different location. As a result, local Party cadres had great power over the peasants 
under their jurisdiction, and peasants had to maintain favour with cadres lest they be 
refused permission to travel or migrate. 
 During the greater part of the Maoist period, when peasants received their 
food rations from their collective or commune and did not have access to city rations, 
migration to the cities would have been fruitless anyway. The commune system in the 
countryside and the system of danwei, or work units, in urban areas were additional 
forms of social control that served to strengthen the hukou system. It was difficult for 
a peasant to survive in an urban area without being connected to a city danwei, since 
access to social services, housing and food were only available through the danwei 
and not on the open market.
164
 Furthermore, those who did migrate were not likely to 
find employment in cities because employment quotas in each danwei were strictly 
controlled by the labour administration.165 The hukou system was particularly 
effective because of these additional administrative systems.166 This is not to say that 
illegal migration did not take place; there did exist a black market for peasant 
labour,167 but the systems in place rendered the risk unattractive.168  
 Another effect was that the problem of surplus rural labour was worsened, 
despite the government’s widely-publicised fear of inadequate grain production and 
labour shortage. If peasants had had the freedom to move to cities for employment, 
there would have been fewer unneeded workers in the villages. While it can also be 
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argued that the cities might have been in danger of becoming severely overcrowded if 
migration had not been so tightly controlled, the central government was evidently 
more anxious about keeping the urban population at a minimum in order to avoid 
spending more on social services than it was about the problem of surplus rural 
labour. 
 Furthermore, the hukou system provided a sharp demarcation between the 
countryside and the cities. In the early 1950s when the system was used for 
registering residence, the goal of separating the rural population from the urban one 
was not obvious to China’s citizens, but as time progressed, state policies began to 
make it explicit that the two were to be physically divided by restricted population 
mobility, and socially divided by means of applying different policies to the two. For 
example, the Criteria for the Demarcation of Urban and Rural Areas issued in 
November 1955 stated that “those living in the rural areas had different lifestyles and 
labored under economic conditions distinct from those of urban residents” and, 
because of this, “government work should vary as between the two kinds of areas”.169 
This kind of official statement would have served to justify the centre’s discrimination 
against peasants.  
Another example of how the state marked this demarcation between the 
countryside and the cities was the leibie classification, one of the two types of 
information on a household’s hukou (the first was one’s place of residence). The 
leibie was a system of categorizing people’s employment status as either ‘agricultural’ 
or ‘non-agricultural’, which sometimes disregarded their actual sector of 
employment.170 Virtually all those who originated in the countryside also possessed a 
hukou with agricultural status. Non-agricultural hukou owners were granted access to 
the urban welfare system, while those with agricultural hukou status were excluded 
from these benefits, even if they were living in a city. A socioeconomic rift between 
the rural and urban people was thus created, irrespective of where they were living. 
Chan and Zhang use the term “caste” to refer to this system because of the obvious 
prioritizing of the urban over the rural residents.171 Zhou comments that “Urban 
people possessed guaranteed subsistence and employment; rural families confronted 
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nature alone”.
172
 This form of discrimination was accentuated by the fact that 
migration from urban to rural areas was not restricted in this way but permitted to take 
place freely.
173
 Urban-rural migration was not actively sought after, however, because 
of the advantages of possessing an urban hukou.
174
       
As a result of the Party’s restrictive rural-urban migration policy, in 1978 the 
registered urban population was still a small minority of China’s total population. The 
figure would likely have been significantly higher had not population mobility been 
so strictly controlled during Mao’s time. 
 
Deng’s Era 
 
After Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, migration patterns once again began to 
change. This was partially a result of changes in migration policy, and partially due to 
the general loosening of state control over the everyday lives of the people. New 
migration patterns during the early reform era proved to have both advantageous and 
disadvantageous results.  
It was not the state’s intention to allow an uncontrollable movement of rural 
workers to flood to the cities. In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the government 
policy was jiudi xiaohua, or ‘absorb rural surplus labour locally’; this policy was 
followed by li tu bu li xiang, or ‘leave the land but not the countryside’, in an attempt 
to control rural-urban migration.
175
 Farmers were permitted to live in small towns as 
long as they were not dependent on the state grain rationing system and other urban 
benefits. This prescription was also supposed to prevent migration to the cities, but it 
only served to increase the sea of migrant farmers.  
 The hukou system, although it was modified, remained in place mainly to 
control the growth of the largest cities, which were typically the most popular targets 
for migrant workers seeking employment. Rather than promote urbanisation through 
the rapid growth of already populous cities, Deng’s government encouraged the 
development of small and medium-sized cities.176 Migration to large cities was still 
strictly controlled. Throughout Deng’s rule, the state cracked down on unregistered 
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rural-urban migration and set further limitations in place to prevent large numbers of 
migrants from flooding the cities. Restrictions were made to reduce the number of 
rural migrants being employed in urban enterprises – sometimes such enterprises had 
to pay a fee per rural worker to the state labour organisation.
177
 According to Feng 
Lanrui, in 1986 and 1989 the State Labour Department tried to end the non-planned 
hiring of rural migrants in state factories by clearing them out. The first attempt was 
mostly unsuccessful. During the second attempt, about 100,000 rural workers were 
removed from state factories.178 In spite of these state restrictions, however, rural-
urban migration continued. It is important to understand the reasons why farmers 
were suddenly more mobile and free to migrate to urban areas. 
Firstly, rural-urban migration started to boom as a natural result of the 
economic and social evolutions that began to take place during the early reform era. 
Liang and Ma point out that China’s economic transition allowed for more geographic 
mobility as the government began to have less control over the movement of the 
population and began to be less capable of enforcing the hukou system.179 Chan and 
Zhang point out that “the real power of the hukou system in regulating migration did 
not come from just the system itself but from its integration with other social and 
economic control mechanisms”.
180
 For example, whereas once rural workers 
depended to a considerable extent on their commune or work unit for food, this 
dependence declined rapidly as a result of Deng’s reforms.  
 Secondly, the rapid growth in the rural industrial sector after 1978 took 
numerous peasants away from farming, and many surplus rural labourers were 
absorbed into township and village enterprises. Thus migration to towns and small 
cities became a popular trend. Although the official line was li tu bu li xiang, jin 
chang bu jin cheng (leave the land but not the countryside, enter the factory but not 
the city), this transfer of much of China’s rural labour to non-agricultural sectors such 
as manufacturing, construction and transportation can be seen as a first step towards a 
greater freedom of movement for rural residents because they were no longer tied to 
agricultural work in their own village. Zhou writes that “the very development of 
small town rural industries increased the access of rural entrepreneurs to urban areas, 
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and the great proliferation of uncontrolled markets overwhelmed the coercive 
restraints implied in hukou”.
181
 
 Thirdly, the decollectivisation of agriculture and the return to family farming 
created an even larger group of surplus rural labourers because of the increase in 
agricultural productivity.
182
 This was a push factor for peasants to seek employment 
outside the agricultural sector. In addition to increased productivity, farmers were 
allowed to sell surplus grain on the open market – they had been prohibited from 
doing this during much of the Maoist era – and they were also able to enter cities and 
set up their own small businesses.183 As a result of this, many rural entrepreneurs 
became the first beneficiaries of the early reform era,184 and some of them were 
successful to the extent that during these early years urban workers were jealous of 
the vast quantities of money that farmers were making.185  
Fourthly, China’s rapid economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s meant 
the opening up of numerous jobs in cities that rural migrant workers could engage in. 
One specific example of this was how Deng Xiaoping’s famous ‘Southern Tour’ of 
1992 was partly responsible for the increased flow of rural workers to the cities 
because of the tremendous growth in the construction industry that followed the 
Tour.
186
 The type of urban employment available to migrants varied according to 
region. For example, in Beijing the majority of rural migrant workers were involved 
in catering, construction and services, while in the Pearl River Delta the jobs available 
for migrants were primarily in the manufacturing industry.
187
 Peasants were popular 
employees in these sectors because they could be paid cheaply, and also because 
urban residents were sometimes unwilling to undertake these kinds of jobs.188 
The dramatic improvement of transportation and communication in reform 
China also served to facilitate migration from the countryside to the cities. David 
Zweig points out that marketing and transportation were commercialised in the mid-
1980s, and this freed farmers to move to the cities in large numbers, seeking jobs, 
markets and a more desirable place to live.189 
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 The vast difference between rural and urban income was a prominent pull 
factor in rural-urban migration, since moving to the cities for employment helped 
some households to considerably raise their standard of living. However, there were 
also a number of problems associated with rural-urban migration during Deng’s time. 
For example, one serious problem that emerged as a result of the conflicting freedom 
of migration and the rigidity of the hukou system was corruption among government 
cadres. Urban hukou could be purchased from city governments at exorbitant prices – 
the going rate for a Shenzhen hukou in the early 1990s was 40,000 to 60,000 yuan. 
Local government cadres controlled this conversion of hukou, which brought profit to 
their government and to them personally.190 This was but one form of corruption that 
emerged during the reform era. The behaviour of government officials, in particular 
rural officials, will be examined in more depth in the following chapter. 
Another major problem that emerged was that while many rural workers were 
able to move outside their village and find jobs in towns and cities, most of them were 
unable to change their hukou status from agricultural to non-agricultural. 
Consequently, many agricultural hukou holders lived in the cities for years while they 
were still not considered bona-fide urban residents, leading the government to 
introduce other methods of migration control such as the issuing of temporary 
residence certificates and citizen identity cards.
191
 In short, temporary migration 
became much easier for peasants, but permanent migration, involving a change in 
hukou status, remained difficult during this time and is still difficult.  
There were ways and means of converting one’s hukou status from 
agricultural to non-agricultural. The most effective methods of obtaining an urban or 
non-agricultural hukou were through higher education, by attaining CCP membership 
of by joining the People’s Liberation Army, or on rare occasions through urban 
connections or by being in an advantageous position in the countryside. Furthermore, 
men were more likely to change their hukou status than women.192 A small number of 
peasants were able to convert their hukou without even changing their place of 
residence, probably because their villages were absorbed by a city or town.193 
According to Wang, non-agricultural hukou were on occasion offered for sale, making 
it possible for migrants to become official urbanites who might not otherwise have 
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been able to obtain the necessary documentation − although this applied mostly to 
small towns and not large cities. If non-agricultural hukou were available in large 
cities, the price was extremely steep, such as was the situation in Shanghai
194
 and in 
Shenzhen, as mentioned earlier. As a result the sale of non-agricultural hukou was not 
always an attractive offer to migrants, many of whom could not afford the hefty cost. 
It is important to recognise that those who managed to convert their hukou status were 
in the minority, and that most migrants in the reform era remained temporary, 
informal migrants, living without the benefits of a non-agricultural hukou. The 
majority of peasants never met the requirements and were therefore stuck as 
‘floaters’, or temporary migrants. The frequently used term for these workers is 
nongmingong, meaning ‘peasant workers.’  
 Thus during Deng’s era there remained a contradiction between the increased 
ease of mobility between the countryside and the cities, and the perpetual reality of 
the hukou policy. This contradiction entailed that people from a peasant background 
were free to live in cities, but were excluded from enjoying the benefits of official 
urban residency. While this served to undercut the socioeconomic segregation 
between the countryside and the urban areas, it also created a new underclass of rural 
migrant workers in the cities. It is ironic that the government showed the rural 
migrants such neglect in the light of the economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s that 
these migrant workers contributed to. This neglect highlights the central government’s 
pursuit of rapid economic growth without regard to its social consequences – 
consequences for which it would later pay.  
 
Jiang’s Era 
 
Migration under Jiang followed a similar path to that during Deng’s time. The 
nongmingong continued to comprise a massive pool of floating workers. The hukou 
system remained in place, still cutting off many unofficial migrants from social 
services in the cities, since the government did not take the necessary steps to 
guarantee informal migrants the same benefits as official urban residents. Looking 
back in 2004, Wu and Treiman observed that, “In the reform era, the hukou system 
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has remained largely in force and still greatly shapes socioeconomic status and life 
chances”.
195
  
The pursuit of a higher income continued to be a strong pull factor for 
migration during this time. Seeking income and employment in urban areas was one 
of three main avenues by which a peasant household could hope to increase its 
income; the other two methods were by increasing farm production and by engaging 
in non-agricultural activities in rural areas.196 As mentioned in Chapter 1, agriculture 
in the Jiang era was not a desirable activity in China – with the exception of farmers 
who lived close to large urban centres and profited greatly by selling fresh produce at 
market prices − for reasons such as the low prices paid for products, the high cost of 
farm equipment and agricultural supplies, and the various taxes which so burdened 
farmers over the years. Moving to the cities was indeed an attractive option for 
peasants in search of more lucrative employment opportunities, as the urban-rural per 
capita disposable income ratio grew to be as much as 2.82 to 1.197 Furthermore, 
average income in the east was significantly higher than that in China’s western 
region, making the coastal cities particularly attractive choices for rural migrants. By 
migrating from the western region to the east, one’s income could increase by 40 per 
cent.
198
 According to a 1995 survey by Wang and Zuo, rural migrants moving to 
Shanghai could on average earn double their previous income.
199
 Liang and Ma’s 
research indicates that the most popular urban destinations for nongmingong were the 
booming metropolises of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, although there was a 
floating population in every province in China.200 According to the 2000 census, 27 
percent of the total population of Shanghai were floating workers.201 Gustafsson and 
Li point out that at the time of their research in 2001, approximately one quarter of the 
urban population – that is, between 50 and 80 million – had no urban hukou202  and 
were thus officially still registered as ‘agricultural.’ Yet however attractive urban 
work might have been for rural migrants, the truth is that the employment 
opportunities were very different from those pursued by city-dwellers who were not 
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migrants. In big cities such as Shanghai there were essentially two labour markets: 
one for urbanites including professionals, technical staff, leaders of government 
organisations and office clerical staff; the other for the unskilled rural labourers. 
These latter jobs often had longer hours, poor working conditions, lower pay and no 
benefits such as child care, subsidised housing and transportation.
203
 In addition to 
these disparities in working and living conditions, a huge number of rural migrants 
lived segregated from urban residents in temporary housing, such as in their 
workshops, in dormitories, or in shelters at the work site.204 This shows how 
inequality existed not just between the countryside and the city, but also within the 
city itself. Wang and Zuo write, “The old divisions that separated rural and urban 
China geographically in the past are now replaced by barriers that segregate them 
economically and socially within cities”.205 This was surely not the kind of 
urbanisation that China’s leaders considered desirable.  
 Jiang’s era also saw a significant amount of social unrest and increasing 
tension among rural migrants. Friedman writes: “there is a basis for the fears of 
privileged urban conservatives, some truth that these mobile farmers in the city, 
denied any government benefits, harassed by the police, and looked down upon by 
urban folk, are angry and could yet be a force for further change”.
206
 Aside from the 
discriminatory effects of the hukou system, one evident problem associated with the 
unrest is the fact that a number of migrant workers experienced delays in payment and 
even the lack of payment, particularly in the construction industry. This served as a 
major source of dissent in the cities. The threat that migrants’ discontent poses to the 
nation’s stability will be examined further on in this chapter. 
Additionally, there was the concern of job security. Unlike urban workers laid 
off from collapsing state-owned enterprises, nongmingong had no access to pensions 
and benefits if they were made redundant, even though the state pensions were often 
mediocre.207 What is more, even acquiring an urban hukou did not solve all of the 
migrants’ problems; those who obtained one were sometimes still barred from a 
number of urban benefits.208  
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Another concern of Jiang’s time was that rural-urban migration exacerbated 
the problem of urban unemployment. Because of China’s massive population 
momentum, approximately 13 million people were entering the job market each 
year.
209
 In terms of net rural unemployment, some officials believe that the figure was 
increasing by 9 million per year,
210
 and many of these rural unemployed sought 
employment in the cities. Another issue that added to the unemployment problem was 
the mid-1990s dismissal of many workers from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) when 
the vast majority of these enterprises were privatised and many were shut down, 
leaving 20 million jobless, even though 17 million people were absorbed into the 
private sector from 1996 to 1998. Indeed, the laid-off workers were not the only 
unemployed living in the cities at the time – there were also many redundancies from 
urban collectives.211 Eyferth, Ho and Vermeer believe that rural-urban migration, like 
rural non-agricultural industry, does not completely solve the problem of surplus rural 
labour. They write: 
 
Migration … is also unlikely to provide much new employment in the 
coming years. The rapid rise in urban unemployment caused by the 
restructuring of the state-owned sector, puts pressure on urban 
governments to reserve remaining jobs for the urban underemployed. 
So there is a continuous need to secure gainful employment in 
agriculture.
212
 
 
Because of urban unemployment problems, some city governments issued 
specific regulations that prevented rural migrants from working in certain jobs. For 
example, in one Beijing district, rural migrants were barred from taking employment 
in not less than 35 job types because of regulations made by the Labour Bureau, and 
in those jobs where migrants were allowed, employers had to pay a per capita fee for 
each migrant they employed.213     
Apart from the massive population, there are a number of other possible 
reasons for the problem of surplus rural labour in China in Jiang’s time. For example, 
it has been suggested that the labour to land ration worsened due to increasing 
population and decreasing land quality.
214
 A consistently decreasing amount of arable 
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land per capita would require fewer and fewer agricultural workers, releasing yet 
more into other sectors in urban locations. 
The inefficiency of agriculture also contributed to the problem of surplus rural 
labour. During the revolutionary era, collective farming employed far more people 
than was necessary, and the return to family farming in the early reform era meant 
that some family members could seek employment in non-agricultural sectors while 
only those members absolutely essential to working the land would engage in farm 
work. As time passed, farming also became increasingly mechanised − at least in 
more developed regions − creating more surplus rural labourers ready for employment 
in other domains. In many parts of rural China, however, the productivity of 
agriculture has not increased significantly since the early days of the agricultural 
reforms due to lack of technology and low levels of investment in agriculture. The 
important point to grasp here is that during Jiang’s era, agriculture was not employing 
more, but fewer workers. To demonstrate to what extent employment in primary 
industry has dropped in the past two and a half decades, among economically active 
people, the percentage of those engaged in primary industry in 1978 was 70.5 percent; 
by 1990 the figure was down to 60.1 percent; in 2000 it was a mere 50 percent and by 
2005 it had dropped to 44.8 percent.
215
 As employment in primary industry dropped, 
the percentage of those involved in secondary and tertiary activities rose from 17.3 
per cent and 12.2 per cent respectively in 1978 to 21.4 per cent and 18.5 per cent in 
1990, then to 23.8 per cent and 31.4 per cent by 2005. This indicates that in the initial 
stages of the reform era, it was secondary industry that began to attract the greater 
portion of ex-agricultural workers, but in recent years employment in the tertiary 
sector has begun to take precedence over secondary industry. Indeed, the growth of 
tertiary industries in China’s cities had a significant impact on rural-urban migration. 
As China’s city dwellers have increasingly sought jobs in the service sector, they have 
left large gaps in secondary industries, which have attracted rural workers.216 The 
growing number of joint-venture and private enterprises has also created employment 
opportunities for rural workers.217  
Not only did the employment structure change in the Jiang era, but the decline 
of township and village enterprises also contributed to the problem of surplus rural 
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labour. TVEs had absorbed a large number of workers during their heyday − Becker 
writes that when rural enterprises were in their prime, they were absorbing 12 million 
additional workers per year
218
 − but in Jiang’s era these enterprises failed to provide 
enough jobs for rural workers seeking employment outside the agricultural sector. On 
top of this, while the development of TVEs did much to alleviate the problem of 
unemployment in the eastern region, the huge remaining pool of surplus rural 
labourers in the inland regions remained a challenge.219 Li believes that “there is 
every reason to expect the issues related to surplus rural laborers and internal 
migration to become even more acute, especially as China’s urban unemployment rate 
continues to increase”.220 
A major event during Jiang’s reign was China’s accession to the WTO. This 
may also have significant implications for the employment situation in China.221 For 
example, Solinger writes that entry to the WTO means that higher quality labour is 
demanded in China. This will automatically disqualify many from their jobs and in 
their place machinery will take over, and younger, more educated employees will be 
preferred for employment over those workers with few skills. The increased 
efficiency demanded will mean the laying off of many workers.
222
 Granted, Solinger 
is referring to the laying off of urban, not rural, workers. However, it can be argued 
that greater unemployment among urban workers may also bring about fewer 
employment opportunities for rural migrant workers. Burns suggests that urban 
unemployment in China may already be as high as twenty percent, even though 
official figures state it to be only three percent at the time of writing in 1999.223 If 
there are not enough jobs even for urban residents, what will become of those rural 
migrants who seek employment in the cities? Will this not lead to innumerable social 
tensions? 
On the other hand, some scholars argue that surplus rural labour has its 
advantages and are more optimistic about the outcome of the employment situation. 
For instance, Li reveals that some experts are of the opinion that “surplus rural 
laborers provide great human resources for the country to reconstruct the economy, 
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accelerate urbanization, and further rapid economic growth”.
224
 The positive effect of 
surplus labourers in the urbanisation process, however, will depend on how China’s 
leaders undertake the task of reforming the nation’s migration policy.  
 What policy initiatives were made under Jiang’s government to address the 
problems associated with internal migration? Some positive steps were made. For 
example, the government took steps to foster urbanisation, recognising that it was a 
critical process in the nation’s modernisation. The 10th 5-year plan (covering 2001 to 
2005) called for the development of super-large and large cities as well as enlarging 
medium-sized cities. In addition to this, the Planning Commission aimed to have half 
of China’s population classified as urban by the year 2015.225 This figure is well on its 
way to being met. In 2005 the figure reached 42.99 percent; this can be contrasted to 
the mere 26.41 percent in 1990.226  
It is important to note here, however, that some scholars believe China’s 
official statistics regarding urbanisation to be unreliable because of the ambiguity 
surrounding the definition of the urban population. According to Zhang and Zhao, 
there are four main factors that may influence the size of the urban population. These 
factors – which have been changed multiple times − include the criteria for defining a 
settlement as urban, the physical and administrative boundaries of so-called urban 
centres, the hukou system, and the status of floating nongmingong.
227
 These factors 
provoke confusing questions such as, “Are only those with urban hukou considered 
part of the urban population?” “What about ‘floaters’ who have been living in a city 
for a number of years without attaining official urban residency?” It is thus difficult to 
determine exactly how large China’s urban population really is and at what rate 
urbanisation is taking place.  
At the end of his rule, at the 16th Party Congress, Jiang’s outgoing report 
included the direction to speed up urbanisation and to remove “all the institutional and 
policy barriers to urbanization”.228 This may seem to indicate a turning point for the 
destiny of rural migrants. But Solinger comments, “And yet, even here, there is the 
accustomed emphasis on containing such movement by keeping it “rational and 
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orderly … [and] guided””.
229
 This indicates that despite his charge to pursue 
urbanisation, Jiang’s main goals were still stability and control.  
Because the control of population mobility and the pursuit of social stability 
remained primary focuses of Jiang’s generation of leaders, the lot of migrants did not 
differ much between Deng’s and Jiang’s era. Looking back on the whole reform era in 
2004, Wu and Treiman wrote, “Despite the increasing tolerance of informal rural-to-
urban migrants in the reform era … the state has in no way relaxed its stringent 
requirements for obtaining formal urban hukou status and has, if anything, tightened 
them”.230 Not only has this served to emphasise the social stratification in China, but 
it has also brought about resentment by many migrants towards those who deny them 
equal living and working conditions. 
 
Hu’s Era 
 
Hu Jintao’s government has set itself the task of ‘cleaning up’ all of China’s 
socioeconomic woes – in particular those that relate to the countryside. The internal 
migration process is one woe that desperately needs addressing. In order to 
understand the issues associated with rural-urban migration in Hu’s era, it is important 
to identify the remaining problems, discuss the solutions the new government has 
initiated, and speculate about the future of China’s urbanisation.  
 
Remaining problems 
 
One of the main problems inherited by Hu’s government is that of lack of payment or 
delays in payment to migrant workers. One of the chief industries in which this 
problem occurs is construction, since the systems for the protection of workers’ rights 
have not been in place. A second significant challenge to Hu’s generation of 
leadership is tackling the inequalities between bona fide urban residents and 
temporary migrants living in the cities. Inequalities still exist in areas such as 
education opportunities, housing access and living conditions, accident-related 
insurance, and access to and quality of health care. Thirdly, China’s leadership needs 
to take advantage of its surplus labour while at the same time being prepared for 
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potential labour shortages in the future. Whether or not China is approaching an 
imminent labour shortage, the World Bank report referred to earlier asserts that it is 
important to be aware of the changing labour market due to economic and social 
change. It states, “Irrespective of the exact amount of surplus labor now, however[,] it 
is clear that continued rapid development and urban growth will eventually lead to the 
end of surplus labour and a tighter labour market, even for migrants”.
231
 In light of 
this and the above speculations, it will be necessary for Hu’s generation of leadership 
to make the most of the existing labour surplus, on one hand creating more channels 
for employment to reduce current unemployment, while on the other hand being 
prepared for the possibility of a shrinking pool of surplus labourers.  
A further issue is the question of the manner in which urbanisation should be 
pursued. Hu’s government has inherited the colossal task of enabling urbanisation to 
take place in a sustainable, peaceful manner. This is important because urbanisation is 
an almost universal feature of the modern pattern of development. James Wen, 
associate professor of economics at Trinity College, Hartford, believes that 
“urbanization is the source of progress, a symbol of civilization, and a sign of 
modernization”.232  
 
A threat to the regime? 
 
Before discussing the current government’s response to the problems described 
above, it is important to ask whether the problems associated with rural-urban 
migration pose a threat to the CCP’s continued rule. Earlier on in the reform era, the 
government recognised the threat of social instability that migration trends have 
brought about. Li writes that “It seems neither possible nor desirable for Chinese 
authorities to keep millions of surplus rural labourers on farmland, but rapid and 
large-scale internal migration is seen as politically dangerous to the regime”.
233
 What 
are the various threats perceived? 
Firstly, one danger that the state possibly associates with the large number of 
rural migrants is the historical pattern of landless migrant farmers causing chaos and 
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overthrowing the ruling dynasty.
234
 As a result of the state’s wariness of rural 
migrants, many have been sent back to the countryside during various ‘clean-up’ 
campaigns.
235
 It should be noted that some rural migrants have been able to obtain a 
lanka, or blue card, which provides legal urban residence without the benefits of an 
urban hukou. Legal residents with a lanka do not have to be sent back to the villages 
during such campaigns.236  
Another reason why rural migrants may pose a threat to the country’s stability 
is their sheer numbers. Even if these workers live long-term in the city, they are not 
considered bona fide urban residents because their hukou status remains agricultural. 
It is difficult to determine the exact number of surplus workers, although official 
estimates make the number of floating workers out to be 200 million.237 On one hand, 
rural-urban migration is a normal phenomenon, and China’s leaders should encourage 
rather than prevent it. Wu and Treiman explain that “Massive and uncontrolled 
migration from the countryside into urban areas typically accompanies economic 
development in developing nations”.238 However, it is not just urban overpopulation 
that China’s leaders fear. Kerry Brown writes that the government is also wary of 
groups of migrant workers in the metropolises uniting together, “creating ghetto 
spaces where the viral infection of their discontent could pass more easily, and 
become a literal pandemic of discontent leading to a political programme demanding 
change and the removal of the one-Party state”.
239
 He Xin, a Communist theorist, 
once wrote, “Once they [rural migrants] get organizations with an educated leadership 
and a political program, the floating rural population could be molded into a political 
force, a mobile, armed, and formidable antisocial coalition”.240 If China’s floating 
migrants were to rise up against the state, their colossal number would certainly not 
be easy to suppress. As long as migrant discontent remains on a small scale, it does 
not pose a significant threat, but if action becomes collective, organised, and large-
scale, it could cause instability and seriously undermine the legitimacy of the Party. 
 A third reason why China’s rural migrants may pose a threat to the central 
government is because of their continued treatment as an underclass. While the hukou 
                                                 
234 Wang in Li, 1996, p.1123 
235 Li, 1996, p.1123 
236 Zhou, 1996, p.169 
237 Li, 1996, p.1129; Meeting the needs of migrant workers, 2008 
238 Wu and Treiman, 2004, p.363 
239 Brown, 2007, p.163 
240 in Zhou, 1996, p.162 
 63 
 
system may have been somewhat successful in controlling excessive rural-urban 
migration during times when the cities could not support so many migrants, it has also 
served to widen the social gap between rural people and urban citizens in the cities. 
Of this new era of rural-urban migration, Solinger writes: 
 
 Finally the state had found a very cheap way to make massive 
use of the labor reserve that peasants had long been made to constitute, 
keeping them subjects – and urban noncitizens – as it did so. They 
fostered economic growth even as, left to fend for themselves, they 
freed the state from its charge of provisioning all of the city’s 
residents.241 
 
The migrants’ living conditions are typically well below the level of urban residents; 
they have low wages and are not entitled to quality housing. Not only is this true, but 
the children of migrants have often been denied access to education in city schools, or 
they are charged exorbitant fees which they cannot afford. Some city labour offices 
have continued the Jiang-era policies of restricting the number of rural workers and 
taxing their employers. Some bureaux have also set aside certain jobs for urban hukou 
holders only, making it extremely difficult for some migrants to find work in cities.242 
Many of those migrants who do find jobs often experience delays in payment, and are 
sometimes not even paid at all. In short, the hukou system has continued to be used to 
exploit China’s officially designated rural population. This may fuel discontent and 
displays of unrest amongst the migrant population. If the hukou system were to allow 
rural migrants equal socioeconomic benefits to those of official urban residents, the 
danger of instability might be less of a threat. 
Fourthly, China’s rural migrants are also well aware of the problem of rural-
urban inequality because of their freedom of mobility. The previous chapter discussed 
the possibility of a threat to China’s stability through peasants’ discontent due to their 
low income and the comparatively underdeveloped situation of the countryside 
compared with the rapidly developing cities. As Dittmer points out, the great 
inequalities between the cities and the countryside might not pose such a threat to 
China’s political stability if rural people did not have such freedom of mobility. The 
great contrast between the lives of urban residents and those of rural dwellers is very 
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visible to them and may have created a bitter sense of resentment among those who 
have migrated.
243
  
 The hukou system has certainly not served to maintain the legitimacy of the 
current regime in the eyes of those who are the losers in the system. China’s leaders 
are well aware of the potential threat from this social stratum, and are taking measures 
not only to reduce this threat, but also to balance the critical process of urbanisation in 
order to promote the all-round modernisation of the nation. The fourth generation of 
leadership’s attitude towards these issues is summed up in its famous slogan ‘Building 
a Harmonious Socialist Society.’ In order to meet this ideological goal, Hu’s 
government is aiming to create stability, harmony and peace, while at the same time 
promoting an advanced, developed, high-tech society. To satisfy these goals in the 
sphere of migration, the current government is taking concrete measures to address 
the problem of social inequality and unrest in the cities, as well as to develop the 
countryside so that peasants will have a motive for remaining in their rural place of 
origin. These measures are described below. 
 
Current government responses 
 
Firstly, the government under Hu is beginning to show that it is serious about 
upholding the rights of rural migrants, and aims to make life in the cities easier for 
this group. A number of cities are making efforts to provide social services such as 
education, medical care, and improved access to housing for nongmingong and their 
families. For example, in 2002 Shanghai began an insurance plan for migrant 
workers, which contributes to their health insurance, work-related accidents, and 
pensions.244 In Beijing, the labour and social security bureau has set up a hotline to 
answer migrants’ questions regarding government policy and workers’ rights.245 
While such measures are being made to improve the quality of life for rural migrants, 
in the meantime, talks are being held and progress is being made toward the possible 
reform of the hukou system. For example, the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), a government-sponsored organisation, suggested the 
neutralisation of the hukou system to prevent rural migrants from being barred from 
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benefits that until now only urban residents have enjoyed. That is, there would still be 
a registration system in place, but it would not exclude migrants from social benefits 
and services in the urban area in which they register. The NDRC Deputy Secretary 
General, Ma Liqiang, believes that by 2020 farmers living in cities should enjoy the 
same opportunities and privileges as urban residents.
246
  
In addition to the idea of reforming the hukou system, some scholars inside 
China have even suggested the possibility of its complete removal. Duan Chengrong, 
director of the Research Center for Population and Development at Renmin 
University believes that the current system is no longer viable because of the huge 
increase in migration rates in reform China. He asserts that “Hukou reforms … could 
allow China to channel labor to where it is most needed, rather than to areas most 
popular among the labor pool.” In light of this, the government needs to take 
advantage of the surplus labour while empowering China’s workforce to be skilful 
and productive. However, if hukou reform is to be carried out, it needs to be done 
carefully. If a change in migration policy via removal of the hukou system is not 
accompanied by the appropriate social programmes, Duan states that “the only kind of 
freedom that official red seal will provide for is the freedom to create urban slums” – 
an outcome that the government must avoid at all costs. Trial reforms are currently 
taking place in some provinces,
247
 which is evidence of the government’s 
commitment to take tangible steps toward improving the rural migrants’ lot, while 
simultaneously strengthening its own validity. However, if this talk of hukou reform 
proves to be empty rhetoric, the social problems associated with China’s internal 
migration system will continue to worsen and possibly threaten the nation’s stability. 
On the other hand, if the government is successful in upholding migrants’ rights, this 
will help to neutralise the threat of instability. 
Secondly, the issue of lack of payments or delayed payments for migrant 
workers that plagued Jiang’s era may be solved under a new law of protection for the 
payment of migrant workers.248 Another recent example of the government’s effort to 
ensure migrant workers’ payment is the recovery of a large number of missed 
payments − about 43.32 billion yuan in total − by all levels of government between 
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2003 and 2007.
249
 In his work report at the 10
th
 National People’s Congress, Premier 
Wen Jiabao proudly stated that a total of 183.4 billion yuan had been repaid to 
construction companies to whom the money was owed due to payment defaults; this 
repayment constituted 98.6 percent of the debt. This enabled migrant construction 
workers to receive wages that had been long owed to them.
250
 Some of the 
metropolises, which have attracted large numbers of nongmingong, are cracking down 
on employers who delay workers’ payments. For example, the Beijing bureau of 
labour and social security is requiring employers to submit salary payment documents 
as evidence that workers’ wages are not overdue.251 
In order to tackle the issue of labour rights, the government has also recently 
instituted a new labour contract law. The law, which was passed on June 29, 2007, 
and put in place on January 1, 2008, will improve workers’ rights by setting minimum 
wages, including severance pay, limiting overtime, and offer open-ended work 
contracts for employees who have completed two fixed terms.252 If employees have 
worked for a company for more than ten consecutive years, their employer will be 
required to sign no-fixed-term employment contracts with these employees.253 The 
law will place pressure on businesses to set high standards in terms of job security and 
workplace safety. Companies are required to provide written contracts for all full-time 
employees.
254
 However, some believe that although labour conditions will improve 
under the new law, some businesses may continue to take advantage of cheap labour 
while bribing corrupt officials to turn a blind eye.
255
 
A third means to manage the migration problem is the encouragement of 
migration to small towns and cities rather than just to the metropolises such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. This type of migration is an effective way to 
encourage urbanisation – seen by many Chinese elites as an important part of 
reducing rural-urban inequality – without overcrowding the large cities. Zhou 
Qingxing, professor of sociology at Chongqing University, believes that “the increase 
of the urbanization level can help narrow the rich-poor gap and gain coordination of 
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urban and rural development”.
256
 In other words, the process of urbanisation can help 
to strengthen the bridge between the rural and urban economies, so that they can be 
mutually beneficial. On top of this, allowing more rural-born people to find urban 
employment with reasonable wages can improve their household’s standard of living. 
Conversely, if the problem of inequality between the countryside and the cities is 
addressed, it may help to keep migration at a sustainable rate. That is, if rural incomes 
and incomes in small towns and cities are comparable to those in big cities, then there 
will be less motivation to migrate to the large urban centres. 
Fourthly, the current government seeks to capitalise on the current labour 
market. According to the World Bank Quarterly Update in September 2007, phasing 
out the hukou system and providing social services to rural migrants and their families 
would help guarantee the availability of surplus labour to urban areas. Another 
important task – which the current government has already begun to tackle – is the 
implementation of vocational skills training for migrants, particularly for those who 
are too old to go through formal education programmes. 257 Cities such as Beijing are 
offering professional training for migrants; this is a joint effort by the government and 
local employers. In this way, they are able to keep up their skills so as to maximise 
their employment potential.
258
 Along with vocational training, the government is 
seeking to create links between labour demand and supply, so that rural migrants will 
no longer follow the trend of job seeking through informal networks.
259
 This will help 
to manage migration so that the cities are not flooded with large numbers of 
unemployed workers.       
According to the World Bank report, some reports have suggested that China 
may face labour shortages in the near future.260 Reasons stated for the concern over a 
declining labour surplus are recently reported unfilled job vacancies, particularly in 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong and Zhejiang provinces; also, the idea that rising 
wages for both highly skilled and lower skilled workers and migrants, and high 
turnover rates in employment are resulting in increased competition between 
companies for workers.261 For example, Cai Fang’s 2007 report reveals a belief that 
the number of surplus rural labourers is much lower than the typical estimate of 150-
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200 million because many people registered as employed in the agricultural sector are 
older and are thus less employable than younger workers; for this reason Cai Fang 
estimates a total of merely 40 million surplus labourers.
262
  
Fears of an impending labour shortage based on figures such as those of Cai 
Fang, however, are unfounded. All that these figures indicate is that there are 
alternative ways of calculating surplus labourers to those officially published. The 
same World Bank report cites a number of reasons why the labour shortage may not 
be such a rapidly approaching crisis as some researchers believe. These reasons 
include the fact that the labour shortages reported have been concentrated in certain 
industries and certain companies, rather than being a universal trend; also, there is 
some ambiguity over the number of people who are registered as being employed in 
the agricultural sector but are actually working as migrants in other sectors. Another 
reason why China may not be facing a looming labour shortage is that employment in 
agriculture is expected to decline as China develops and as agriculture becomes more 
productive, releasing more labourers into other sectors. Additionally, official statistics 
regarding wage increases are incomplete and do not fully display the actual situation. 
Some workers have seen very low wage increases, and so reports on the seriousness 
of competition between firms for labourers may be exaggerated. Finally, the labour 
market data is believed to be of poor quality and thus unreliable.
263
 Whether or not 
China is facing a labour shortage, the government continues to face the mammoth 
challenges of linking labour supply and demand and maximising the productivity of 
labour.  
A fifth measure being undertaken by the current government to tackle the 
social problems created by rural-urban migration is the enhancement of the standard 
of living in the countryside as an incentive for peasants to stay put. Push factors such 
as low rural income, the stagnation of agriculture, and low prices for rural goods and 
services, together with pull factors such as the prospect of higher income in the city 
and the attraction of easy-gained temporary employment, have spurred rural-urban 
migration throughout the reform era. The government now aims to diminish the 
influence of these push and pull factors by reducing the rural-urban gap. The 
significance of this strategy is that it is a fresh initiative. Rather than merely trying to 
discourage migration to the cities by preventing migrants from settling there 
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permanently, the government is now encouraging rural people to remain in the 
countryside by developing it so that it is an attractive alternative to migration.  
 China’s current leaders are firm believers in “integration in a balanced 
manner.”
264
 This involves acknowledging the differences between rural and urban 
areas and integrating the two so that urbanisation can take place in an organised way. 
Rather than attempting to urbanise the countryside, the integration process is intended 
to build up rural infrastructure, facilities and the environment so that the countryside 
does not lag behind the cities. Evidence of this strategy can be seen primarily in the 
plan to ‘Build a New Socialist Countryside,’ which was introduced in Chapter 1. 
Elements of this programme, such as the abolition of the agricultural tax, the 
increased fiscal investment in agriculture and in rural social services and 
infrastructure, and the strengthening of the village election system are designed to 
make the countryside a more attractive and prosperous place to live. Ideally, the 
programme will on one hand help to limit rural-urban migration to match the labour 
demand in the cities, while at the same time enhance social stability by improving the 
quality of life of China’s rural people.  
 
Will current strategies achieve success? 
 
Is the central government likely to be successful in neutralising the threat of social 
instability from rural migrants and creating a ‘harmonious society’ for rural migrants? 
The government certainly has good intentions toward tackling the problems 
associated with migration and urbanisation by guaranteeing rural workers’ rights and 
improving their living conditions. However, the success of the centre’s initiatives is 
partly dependent on city labour bureaux and employers effectively implementing the 
appropriate policies and programmes to ensure that migrants’ rights are upheld. If, for 
example, migrant workers continue to experience delays in wage payments or are 
denied affordable access to social services such as education, insurance and health 
care, they will remain discontented. While some progress is being made toward 
upholding workers’ rights, achieving successful implementation of these policies is 
not likely to be an easy task to accomplish, given the hundreds of millions of 
nongmingong and their wide variety of employers.  
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Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the existing hukou system, as long as it 
continues to treat rural migrants as an underclass without proper rights, is not a valid 
means of managing rural-urban migration. The central government’s success in 
achieving a peaceful, sustainable urbanisation process is thus dependent on the careful 
reform of this system. The fact that the government is considering such a reform is a 
positive development. However, this will certainly be a long-term challenge for 
China’s leaders, and progress should not be expected to be rapid. While nongmingong 
continue to experience discrimination and exploitation, the threat to stability is likely 
to remain. 
Throughout the many stages of migration policy in Communist China, the 
migrant peasantry has been fundamentally exploited, yet without them China could 
not have reached its current stage of development. Not only this, but the continued 
longevity of the Party’s rule also depends on these migrants’ contentment. The central 
government has in the past relied on rapid economic growth and the concept of 
‘moderate prosperity’ to gain the approval of its citizens and so ensure its legitimacy, 
but in recent years these trends are only creating social and economic inequalities that 
are instead not only undermining the Party’s reputation, but also potentially 
threatening its survival as the sole ruling party. This chapter has described the extent 
of this threat from the rural migrant class, of which the Party is extremely wary. The 
centre’s colossal task now lies in the defusing of this threat. 
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Chapter 3 
Rural Unrest 
  
This chapter seeks to examine the issue of social unrest in China’s countryside. It will 
describe how rural conflict has arisen during the past several decades, and will 
analyse the extent to which this conflict is a threat to the sustainability of the 
Communist Party’s rule. It will then discuss the current government’s efforts to tackle 
this problem and assess whether these measures will be sufficient to bring stability to 
the countryside. Finally, it will speculate on how the current government’s efforts to 
reduce rural unrest are likely to affect China economically, socially and politically. 
 The discussion of rural unrest here focuses on the development of rural unrest 
during the reform era, since it has been primarily since Deng’s coming to power that 
unrest in the countryside has become a serious problem. This is not to say that there 
was no evidence of rural conflict during Mao’s time, but peasant resistance to the 
state during Mao’s time was primarily indirect265 and covert.266 Displays of unrest 
such as rioting, demonstrations and petitioning occurred rarely, most likely due to the 
repressive political atmosphere of the day. An exception to this was during the famine 
caused by the Great Leap Forward, during which time the Party’s authority was 
broken in some areas. For example, armed rebellions occurred in Tibet, Yunnan, 
Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai.
267
 Apart from these rare outbursts, however, Mao’s era 
saw little outward resistance. 
This chapter begins by commenting on the rise in rural unrest in the reform 
era, then describes three main reasons for peasants’ discontent. It will then discuss 
expressions of peasant dissatisfaction, and comment on the Deng and Jiang 
administrations’ responses. The remainder of the chapter will explain and analyse the 
response of the current government to the rising instability in China’s countryside. 
 Despite the improvement in the standard of living of farmers in Deng’s time, it 
was also during the reign of Deng that farmers began to show dissatisfaction with 
their local leaders overtly, contrasting with their less open resistance during most of 
the Mao era. One possible reason for the new increase in rural unrest that occurred 
after Deng’s rise to power was the increased confidence of peasants to display their 
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dissatisfaction with local officials. Zweig writes: “decollectivization, the end of 
campaigns, and the demise of Maoist ideology have significantly freed the villagers 
… making them more assertive in defence of their interests”.
268
 In the reform era, it is 
the local officials who are the main focus of the peasants’ resistance.
269
 This can be 
attributed to the state’s diminished involvement in the day-to-day lives of the peasants 
with the absence of mass political campaigns, as well as the changing relationship 
between peasants and cadres described below. Another reason for the increase in open 
dissent is that rural residents have become better informed about their rights and about 
illicit cadre behaviour since 1978.270 
While the relaxation of controls in the reform era made protest possible, the 
motives for particular protests were provided by three underlying causes of peasant 
discontent: the high taxes and fees imposed by various levels of government, 
corruption among local cadres, and land seizures.271 These roots of unrest will be 
examined individually. 
 
The peasant burden: taxes and fees 
 
Since relatively early on in the reform era, peasants have been protesting against high 
taxes as well as extra fees and levies demanded by local cadres, which have 
contributed to what is commonly referred to as nongmin fudan, or the peasant burden. 
Taxes and fees have included both the agricultural tax, levied by the township 
government, and other fees charged by the village and township governments.  
Local officials at both village and township levels began to demand more and 
more from the peasants in their jurisdictions for a variety of reasons. The main one is 
that as a result of economic reforms begun under Deng, many local governments 
found themselves lacking in revenue and became dependent on farmers for the 
resources they needed. During Deng’s economic reforms, including the fiscal 
decentralisation process begun in the mid-1980s, local governments were granted a 
greater degree of economic autonomy from the central government, and this changed 
the amount of control over resources that rural cadres had. This had a significant 
impact on peasant-cadre relations. On one hand, after having paid a small portion to 
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upper level governments, local governments were able to keep most of the incoming 
revenue.
272
 On the other hand, these local governments also became more reliant on 
their own resources for their revenue and less dependent on the central government.
273
 
This also resulted in inequality of access to resources between one rural government 
and another, because some areas, particularly those with highly productive township 
and village enterprises, were naturally prosperous, while others struggled to extract 
the revenue they needed for further development.274  
Furthermore, the decollectivisation of agriculture meant that households were 
now in control of the means of production. Farmers still had to pay agricultural tax, 
but this was paid to the township governments and not to the village government, 
since the village level of government was not regarded as a fiscal accounting unit.275 
According to Oi, “The household responsibility system eliminated the right of village 
authorities to income from agricultural production but failed to provide them with a 
sufficient alternative source of revenue.”276 As a result, many village governments 
found themselves lacking in revenue and some even fell into debt. Township 
governments also experienced revenue deficiencies. 
Local governments were also burdened by the decentralisation of public 
services such as healthcare and education, and by the 1980s it was up to local 
governments to foot the bill for these services.
277
 The first nine years of education 
became compulsory nation-wide during the reform era, but many rural governments 
were not able to afford the costs of educating the local children. They also struggled 
to invest money in healthcare, and as a result many clinics were in need of upgrading, 
and doctors’ salaries remain low. The perpetual reality of rural poverty only 
heightened this problem.  
Local governments became highly dependent on local industries as sources of 
revenue and were thus subject to fluctuations in the rural economy. For example, 
officials relied on the prosperous township and village enterprises throughout much of 
the 1980s to obtain local funds, but the decline of these TVEs in the late 1980s and 
1990s meant that cadres could no longer rely on them for additional funds.278 
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Because of their financial predicament, village and township cadres began to 
obtain money by collecting fees and levies from the peasants to compensate for their 
losses. Two such fees, which were actually legitimate, were known as tiliu and 
tongchou, and were paid to the village and township governments respectively. The 
sum of the tiliu and tongchou were not supposed to rise above 5% of peasants’ 
household income, but in reality they often did.279 In addition to the official taxes and 
fees, rural officials charged peasants ad hoc fees for a wide variety of affairs; such 
fees are known as the “three unrulies” or sanluan, and included fees, assessments, and 
fundraising.280 For example, as a result of low government funds, it was often the 
peasants themselves who were required to pay for their own household’s education 
and healthcare. Fees were even charged for things such as getting married and mail 
delivery;281 other examples included fees for the registration of births and the issuing 
of various licenses.282 The tax-for-fee reform introduced under Jiang was intended to 
eradicate these extra fees, but the effects of the reform have yet to be seen. This 
particular reform will be discussed further on in this chapter.  
Local governments also turned to ‘fundraising’ among the peasants in order to 
contribute to the development of their region and to carry out various central 
government policies. Some such fundraising drives were for projects such as road and 
school construction, medical facilities, and construction of power stations.
283
 A key 
reason why local cadres acted under such urgency to develop their regions was the 
existence of the ‘cadre responsibility system.’ The system involved performance 
contracts and provides economic incentives for cadres to reach certain development 
targets, to control family planning, to remit taxes, and to maintain social stability.284 
Thus cadres were highly motivated to provide proof of development in their 
jurisdiction. This kind of behaviour occurred particularly among officials in the inland 
regions, which were poorer and where rural industry was not as developed as along 
the eastern coast.285  
 Cadres also took advantage of the loosening up of the rural-urban migration 
policy. As the danwei and commune systems broke down and peasants were free to 
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move to and from the cities (albeit often without the privilege of urban benefits and 
social services), the demand for urban hukou escalated. Cadres found that they could 
benefit through selling urban hukou. Writing in 1999, Chan and Zhang stated that 
since the fiscal decentralisation reforms of the 1980s, “local governments have been 
aggressively exploiting the sales of urban hukou as a revenue-generating means as 
there is no shortage of demand”.286   
It was not only poor peasants who suffered from the abuse of cadres’ power, 
but also those who were well-off. When collective funds and local government 
incomes were low, cadres were known to collect supplementary funds by using 
blackmail or wresting money from richer entrepreneurial peasants.287 In addition to 
this, before the abolition of the agricultural tax, officials short of revenue were known 
to pay IOU slips for peasants’ grain instead of proper payment, providing another 
reason for peasants to become angry at their leaders.288  
The result of these changes has been a heavy burden for many peasants which 
has continued to the present. The taxes and fees demanded by local officials has 
meant that many peasants have struggled to save money and to have enough for basic 
living costs. Many rural families have not been able to afford schooling for their 
children. China’s Ministry of Health revealed statistics showing that in order to avoid 
paying too much for healthcare, one third of poor rural patients elect not to go to 
hospital, and 45 percent of those in hospital request discharge before they have fully 
recovered.
289
 As an example of the difficult situation peasants have found themselves 
in, Li Qin points out that between 1985 and 1991, peasant incomes increased by 10 
percent, but burdens (taxes and fees) increased by 16.9 percent.290 This offset much of 
the value of their rise in income. The peasant burden has contributed to the problem of 
rural-urban inequality and the low level of development of the countryside in general.  
It should be acknowledged that some taxes and fees are legitimate, for example the 
tiliu and tongchou while they were still in effect – so long as they did not rise above 
the authorised 5 percent.291 However, the problem lies in cadres’ extortion of money 
in excess of what they are legally entitled to collect. For example, local authorities 
found ways to use the 5 percent tiliu and tongchou regulation to their advantage in 
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order to collect more and more fees.
292
 This was partially due to the ambiguity in the 
assessment of the tiliu and tongchou. The agricultural tax, until it was rescinded in 
2006, was also legitimate, but when combined with other miscellaneous fees and 
levies charged by township and village governments, it only added to the peasant 
burden. Becker writes that an estimated 116 billion yuan in illegal fees was collected 
by local governments in 1996 alone.293 Part of the central government’s challenge in 
addressing this issue has been its inability to secure local officials’ cooperation in 
preventing the illegal collection of fees. Another part of the difficulty in solving this 
problem has been the involvement of central government agencies. In some cases, 
central government agencies have been responsible for authorising fundraising 
operations and fee collections, all in the name of rural development.294 This misuse of 
power by the local state, referred to by Evans as ‘predatory’295, is the kind of 
behaviour that began to undermine cadre-peasant relations early in the reform era and 
continues to do so today. 
 
Land expropriation 
 
A second main root of rural unrest is the common problem of land expropriation. On 
numerous occasions peasants have found themselves landless after their land has been 
confiscated and put to other use without their consent – or with forced consent. Often 
these land seizures take place without proper authorisation from higher authorities. In 
many cases, farmers have received inadequate or even no compensation for their land.  
Land is often taken by local government officials to sell to developers, who in 
turn build lavish appartment buildings and other commercial and industrial structures. 
This is also a frequent occurrence when city suburbs spread out and absorb outlying 
rural areas; property that is technically collectively owned is snatched up and 
transformed from agricultural land to urban commercial or residential land.296 Local 
governments have also taken advantage of foreign investors’ eagerness to ‘buy’ land 
for developments such as technological parks and industrial complexes. While this 
phenomenon began in the 1980s with the establishment of Special Economic Zones, it 
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has become more frequent since the 1990s. Although the central government has 
made attempts to quell this prolific sale of land, local governments have resisted 
strongly.  
It is important to acknowledge that land reallocation by rural officials has been 
occurring regularly in villages since the beginning of the reform era, and should not 
be confused with seizures of land for sale to developers. Although the pattern of land 
reallocation differs between regions, agricultural land is frequently redistributed 
between households according to family size, labour supply and demographic 
composition.297  
There are a number of reasons why peasants have become angry when their 
land has been taken from them. In many cases, land expropriated from peasants 
results in their loss of livelihood and security; their situation becomes even worse 
when they are inadequately compensated.298 They also resent local officials’ coercive 
measures to take land, especially when expropriation takes place without the 
necessary authority from higher levels of government.299 On top of this, officials have 
been known to pocket the profits from land sales to developers.300 In this way, local 
officials and private entrepreneurs often gain much when farmland is converted for 
other uses, while the peasants are without a doubt the ultimate losers in the process.
301
 
How can it be that this kind of illegal land transfer continues to take place? 
The key to answering this question is to look at the current land rights system. The 
system allows the use rights of land to be bought and sold, but does not guarantee the 
private ownership of the land itself. Because peasants are prohibited from privately 
owning farmland, the land they use can essentially be demanded from them. In order 
to understand better how the current situation of land rights in China has evolved, it is 
necessary first to glance back to the beginning of the reform period.  
From the 1950s until the late 1970s, the system of agriculture was collective, 
and land was owned collectively as well. When China emerged from the Maoist era 
and Deng Xiaoping began to initiate economic reforms, both the work of farming and 
the use of land were decollectivised. Under the household responsibility system, 
which was introduced in Chapter 1 of this study, land was divided up relatively 
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equally among households, and although the land still belonged to the production 
team, farmers were free to choose how they used the land. Each household was 
obliged to hand over a specified portion of their produce to the production team since 
this went towards the state tax and grain quota, but apart from this, farmers could 
retain what was left and use it as they pleased. Lest farmers fear that the system would 
be on a temporary basis and so invest only scantly in their land, the production teams, 
under a government regulation issued in 1984, leased the land to the farmers for 
periods of up to fifteen years. This fifteen-year period later became a thirty-year 
period. In this way, although the ownership of the land remained collective, land use 
was essentially privatised. Land use rights could be rented, bought, sold and 
mortgaged,302 but privatised land was still prohibited. This is still the case in 
contemporary China. 
An important question to ask here is this: if the farmers do not own the land, 
then who does own it? While the answer to this question essentially remains hazy, it 
can be said that in essence, farmland is collectively owned and the state still has 
ultimate rights over it. However, the Revised Land Administration Law does not 
adequately define the nature of collective ownership, thus rendering land ownership 
ambiguous.
 303
 That is, the law is not clear exactly whether it is the village, the 
township, or the peasant body itself that constitutes the ‘collective’ and thus has 
ownership rights over the land. There are a number of other reasons contributing to 
this ambiguity, such as inconsistencies in applying land tenure regulations, frequent 
changes in land ownership and tenure laws over the course of PRC history, and the 
merging and subdividing of villages in recent years.304 
 There is a relationship between the ambiguity of the land rights system and the 
profusion of land seizures in the countryside. For example, even when the term 
‘collective ownership’ is applied to the village context, this does not entail that the 
village has full control over the land. While the village collective has the right to use 
and to supervise the use of land, the right to “transfer land for compensatory use” does 
not belong to them, since the PRC Land Administration Laws of 1988 and 1999 allow 
for state expropriation of collectively owned land if it is in the public interest.305 Since 
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the township administration has more power over the village administration,
306
 the 
term “ownership” does not hold much weight when applied to the village context. 
This presents clues as to how land is able to be seized so easily from villagers and 
used for other purposes. The village government is in some cases powerless to prevent 
the township government from taking land. Or, on other occasions, the village 
government may cooperate with the township government to surrender village land if 
the village government will benefit financially.307  
Because the reform era has been plagued with land requisitions and the 
subsequent demonstrations and other manifestations of peasant discontent, there has 
been much debate among scholars over whether land should be completely privatised, 
or whether the current state of affairs should be permitted to continue. 
According to Peter Ho, the Chinese government believes that unrest can be 
avoided by maintaining the status quo in terms of land ownership. He argues that the 
Chinese government has purposefully maintained the ambiguous nature of the land 
rights system, asserting: “Legal indeterminacy is a major feature of the current 
Chinese land rights structure. More importantly, a great deal of this stems from the 
needs of the Chinese leadership for sustaining a deliberate institutional ambiguity to 
avoid social conflict”.
308
 By this he means that should land ownership be more clearly 
defined, it is likely that land disputes would become more prolific. He does admit that 
“there is a high risk that the deliberate institutional ambiguity becomes an instrument 
in the violation of villagers’ interests”,
309
 although he does not elaborate on how this 
has already taken place.  
Some observers believe that the continued reluctance of the Party centre to 
relinquish the decades-old system of collective ownership is strongly linked to 
China’s socialist tradition. Socialism in China has traditionally demanded that land be 
collectively and/or state owned. This complies with orthodox Marxism, which is 
opposed to private property (not that the Chinese form of socialism has unswervingly 
followed the tenets of orthodox Marxism). There is also a historical pattern of post-
communist countries welcoming the privatisation of land. 310 It is possible that policy 
makers have been avoiding the privatisation of land so that they can prove that China 
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still complies with the system of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ rather than 
completely giving way to capitalism. And yet while ideology is a likely factor 
involved in the land privatisation issue, it may not be the only one. Oi points out that 
while the government does not allow for the privatisation of land, it does permit the 
privatisation of rural industry.
311
 Thus privatisation in itself is not unknown in reform-
era China. Furthermore, under the economic reforms begun in 1978, China has 
abandoned many socialist principles that it had previously clung to, such as the 
collectivisation of agriculture and the domination of state-owned urban industries. In 
terms of land rights, the Party appears unwilling to give up collective ownership, yet 
still eager to allow individual or household farming. Ho describes the system as “a 
government-owned and controlled land market that prohibits private ownership and a 
free land market; yet with the ideological compromise of paid lease and transfer of 
use rights”.312  
Regarding the reluctance of China’s government to allow the complete 
privatisation of rural land, Oi believes that “While there may still be an ideological 
compass, the lack of consistency in rural policies suggests that other more immediate 
and pressing issues guide decision makers”.
313
 What is implied by “other more 
immediate and pressing issues”? There are a number of factors involved. 
Firstly, the ambiguity of the land tenure system makes it easy for land to be 
taken from the peasants in the name of economic progress. For example, in a study by 
Guo Xiaolin, township and county officials maintained that turning farmland into 
development zones was ultimately beneficial for their regions because it would 
promote the growth of tertiary industry and provide the local people with employment 
and business opportunities (even though there was no statistical proof that the local 
people did benefit from land development).314 Although the central government 
resents the unauthorised seizure of peasants’ land, there are other cases in which it 
supports the conversion of farmland to other development projects which encourage 
economic growth. For this reason, it is to the government’s advantage to uphold the 
collective ownership of land. Furthermore, it is possible that the central government 
does not see the need for land privatisation, considering the post-Mao economic boom 
that has taken place completely under the existing land ownership system. Ho points 
                                                 
311 Oi, 1999b, p.627 
312 Ho, 2001, p.396 
313 Oi, 1999b, p.627 
314 Guo, 2001, p.428 
 81 
 
out that “the impressive economic growth rates that China has shown over the past 
two decades seem to defy the need for privatization of land ownership”.
315
 
Secondly, local government officials have long relied on the sale of land use 
rights as a source of revenue. Often, a large share of the profits from these sales to 
developers goes to local governments, in particular townships.
316
 If land was 
privatised, they would lose this valuable revenue, which for many local governments 
would be catastrophic, given their already insufficient funds, and, in some cases, their 
level of debt. They might then be tempted to resort to extracting even greater fees 
from farmers. 
Thirdly, because of the considerable economic power of rural governments, 
local officials have personally benefited from the sale of land use rights to private 
developers, since it is easy for them to pocket a portion of the money from sales. 
These officials are thus likely to be resistant to changes in the land tenure system. It is 
this kind of motive for maintaining the current land tenure system that incites such 
anger among China’s farmers. They are without a doubt the ultimate losers when 
farmland use rights are sold to developers. 
Despite the government’s reluctance to privatise farmland, there are a number 
of valid reasons why privatisation should take place. Firstly, the deliberate 
institutional ambiguity Ho refers to can actually be said to promote social unrest, 
since it allows for frequent land seizures and the consequent unrest in the countryside. 
It can be argued that if farmers’ land rights were secure, the phenomenon of 
unauthorised land appropriation might become less of a problem. An article in The 
Economist asserts that “Clearer, enforceable property rights are essential if China’s 
30-year boom is to continue and if the tensions it has generated are to be managed 
without widespread violence.”317 While “enforceable property rights” are not 
synonymous with privatised land, recent Chinese history has shown that even long-
term land leases are not watertight and thus are subject to violation by local officials. 
Secondly, there is a relationship between the land ownership system and 
farmland loss in China. Although this issue is not crucial to the problem of rural 
conflict, it is still a critical factor in the land privatisation debate. The loss of arable 
land is significant here as it has partly been brought about as a result of the conversion 
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of farmland to urban and rural construction and industrial uses, which can in part be 
attributed to the effects of the land rights and ownership system. This land conversion 
has taken place at a rapid rate during the reform era. There are, in fact, many other 
causes for the loss of cultivated land that has taken place over the past several 
decades. According to China’s government web portal – citing the Statistical 
Communiqué on the 2005 National Economic and Social Development released by 
the National Bureau of Statistics – the net loss of cultivated land in 2004 was 362,000 
hectares, with losses due to construction (139,000 hectares), disasters (54,000 
hectares), changes in agricultural production (12,000 hectares) as well as an additional 
390,000 hectares of land set aside for ecological preservation. Included in the figure 
were 73,000 hectares of unreported land loss from former years.318 Some of these 
losses in arable land can be considered useful, such as the loss to ecological 
preservation. Vaclav Smil argues that the loss of farmland has also had positive 
results when it has taken the form of changes in agricultural production. For example, 
farmland conversion has turned cultivated land into forests, pastoral land, and 
orchards. Some of these developments contribute to the more well-balanced diet that 
the people of China now enjoy, rather than relying almost wholly on grain for 
nutrition.
319
  
Nevertheless, the loss of farmland due to its conversion for non-agricultural 
purposes is the worrying factor. As the statistics above show, the loss of cultivated 
land due to changes in agricultural production was a mere 12,000 hectares, while the 
loss due to construction was 139,000 hectares, comprising close to 40 percent of the 
total losses for the year. It is possible that if the ambiguity surrounding the issue of 
property rights were completely straightened out, then this kind of farmland loss 
could be brought under control.    
It is vital for China to retain a sufficient amount of quality arable land so that 
agriculture can become more productive. Another important reason to keep an eye on 
farmland loss is to ensure the sufficiency of China’s grain supply. China’s leaders 
have been concerned with the diminishing amount of arable land per capita because of 
the nation’s burgeoning population, and also because throughout Communist China’s 
history, the government has adhered staunchly to the principle of maintaining grain 
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self-sufficiency (with the exception of a short period in the early 1990s).
320
 Even as 
recently as 2004, the central government issued a 6-month suspension on all non-
urgent conversions of agricultural land to stem the rapid loss of farmland.
321
 Oi points 
that even if China is not able to supply all its own grain, it can still import more
322
, 
although this would mean becoming increasingly dependent on other nations for its 
food supply.  
Becker asserts that China actually has more arable land per capita than nearby 
countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea, and that it has the capacity to 
increase its total area of valuable farmland. He makes the point, however, that this 
would require “investment in irrigation and better seeds, investment that an individual 
peasant might not be prepared to make unless he was assured ownership”.323 It can be 
argued that the long-term, renewable leases granted to peasants – up to thirty year 
contracts – are long enough to assure peasants that such investments would be 
profitable. Additionally, the PRC Property Law, which became effective on October 
1, 2007, allows for automatic renewal of land leases, giving peasants even longer-
term land use rights.324 However, with the continuing trend towards land 
expropriation, peasants may still be wary of spending a lot of money on land which 
may be seized at any given time in the name of property development: the new law 
does not grant farmers full private ownership of the land. Property rights do affect the 
productivity of agricultural land because they influence how the land is used, and 
what kind of investment is put into the land.
325
 If the necessary resources such as 
water for irrigation, quality seed, environmentally friendly fertilisers and other 
technology were subsidised by the state, however, peasants might be more likely to 
increase investment in their land and in this way enhance the land’s productivity 
without going through a process of land privatisation. 
To privatise or not to privatise land remains a sticky question. Ho 
acknowledges:  
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As land tenure touches on the very foundations of the Chinese state, 
striking the right balance between ideology and the socio-economic 
reality is an arduous task for the central leadership. The question is 
how far privatization can proceed before corrupting the Marx-Leninist 
principles of state and collective land ownership.326  
 
Yet when the nation’s stability is at stake, or at least stability in the countryside, this 
question may need to be answered sooner rather than later. Whether land is privatised 
or not, China’s farmers need to have some guarantee of the security of their land 
tenure in order for the rural conflict associated with this issue to diminish. 
 
Corruption in the local government  
 
A third cause for rural unrest among the rural population is the perpetual occurrence 
of what Zhao Renwei refers to as “disorder changes” – including corruption and 
insider control among government officials.
327
 This is essentially linked to the 
previous points regarding illegal fee exactions and land seizures, since in many cases 
the behaviour of local officials constitutes a form of corruption.  
For example, China’s rural dwellers become angry when rural officials misuse 
tax money for their own benefit. During the reform era, they have used their power 
and networks not only to build up government coffers in the absence of sufficient 
funding from the central government, but they have also sought to benefit personally 
from economic growth in their areas and to control resources such as land.328 They 
have been known to ‘wine and dine’ liberally at the expense of local taxpayers329 and 
to use taxpayers’ money for all sorts of other luxuries. While corruption exists at all 
levels of government, it is primarily officials at the village, township and county 
levels whose corruption peasants have been demonstrating against in recent years 
because it directly affects their livelihood.  
 Another example of local authorities’ abuse of power is that some local 
government officials have benefited considerably from their connection with foreign 
firms who take advantage of rural China’s cheap labour. Local officials work together 
with foreign investors to ignore labour rights. The incentive for local officials to act in 
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this way is that the cheap labour available by violating labour rights often helps to 
boost economic performance in their township or region, which in turn gives these 
officials the chance for promotion.
330
 Not only is this phenomenon a form of local 
government corruption, but it is also encouraging the cycle of peasant exploitation 
that was begun in the Maoist period. Unfortunately, the existing labour unions, which 
all belong to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, often fail to protect these 
workers’ rights.331  
Corruption among local government officials has been a perpetual problem 
during the reform era, and has increased as years have passed. Government figures 
show a nearly 100-fold increase in official corruption and bribery cases brought to 
court from 1979 to 1989.332 The Communist Party’s Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection (CCDI) reported 3,128 corruption cases involving government 
workers and taxes worth 968 million yuan (121 million US dollars) from August 2005 
to June 2006.333 These figures relate to Party and government officials in general, not 
just local rural cadres, so it is not known how many of these cases occurred among 
rural government employees. However, the figures suggest an enormous challenge for 
China’s leaders to diminish the problem of corruption. Furthermore, these are the 
official figures for those corruption cases that are known to have occurred, so the total 
number of cases is certainly greater still. 
One particularly important reason why China’s top leaders need to tackle the 
problem of corruption in the countryside is because of the recent abolition of the 
agricultural tax. Many local officials have for long depended on the agricultural tax, 
as well as other taxes and fees, for both local revenue and their own well-being. There 
is anxiety among China’s leaders that the reduction of local government revenue due 
to the abandonment of this long-standing tax is likely to drive corrupt officials to seek 
money elsewhere – for example by illegitimately exacting fees from peasants – as 
they have been doing throughout the reform era. An official source admits, “It is … 
difficult to reform the county and township financial systems, which are closely 
bound to officials’ personal interests. It is entirely possible that administrative organs 
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at these levels, whose existence has mainly relied upon agricultural taxes, will fall 
into an unprecedented predicament”.
334
  
 
Expressions of discontent 
 
In response to the local authorities’ behaviour and the arbitrariness of fee exactions, 
the expropriation of farmland and corruption among local officials, many of China’s 
rural dwellers have taken action to show their dissatisfaction.335 Rural unrest has been 
on the rise during the reform era, and remains a thorn in the central government’s 
flesh. According to Yu, the illegal seizures of peasants’ land and the conversion of 
agricultural land to industrial and recreational uses have become the most significant 
source of peasant unrest since 2000.336 Alvin So writes that a “new wave” of land 
seizures has swept through the countryside since the year 2000.337 The central 
government recorded 87,000 “public order disturbances” in the year 2005, compared 
to 10,000 in 1994.338 According to Zhou Yongkang, the Minister of Public Security, 
the number of “mass incidents” numbered 74,000 in 2004, which equates to about 200 
demonstrations, riots, and other displays of rebellion per day.
339
 In the case of protests 
against land seizure, some have been directed toward local officials, while at other 
times the property developers are the target.  
While not all rural citizens have been quick to take part in popular resistance, 
those who have participated have manifested their discontent in all manner of ways, 
both legal and illegal. Resistance has taken the form of violent and non-violent, 
collective and individual protests.340 Peasants have been known to riot, to surround 
government buildings and even to set fire to officials’ offices.341 Other measures of 
protest include petitioning342, lodging collective letters of complaint at higher 
levels,343 and suing the government.344 Li and O’Brien classify villagers as either 
compliant (shunmin), recalcitrants (dingzihu), or policy-based resisters (diaomin). The 
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attitude of these three types of peasants towards the behaviour of rural cadres is 
markedly different. While even compliant villagers may grumble quietly, they 
typically refrain from making any move toward public resistance.
345
 Such villagers 
are convinced that the cost of overt action against the authorities is greater than the 
potential benefits.
346
 Recalcitrants, on the other hand, are often violent, dramatic and 
defiant in their resistance. Policy-based resisters take legal courses of action – 
including both individual and collective action – to vent their dissatisfaction. Aware 
of their rights and obligations, they observe only official laws and policies rather than 
the arbitrary demands of local authorities.347   
How successful are peasants in expressing their grievances? Public displays of 
discontent such as rioting attract attention not only from the central government but 
also from the general population and outside observers. In light of this, such 
demonstrations cannot be ignored. At the same time, they are also subject to 
suppression by the authorities. Property developers have even been known to retaliate 
violently against the protesting villagers, which has only deepened the problem. For 
example, in June 2005 in Shengyou village in Hebei province, villagers unhappy 
because of land seizures were beaten by a mob of hooligans sent by property 
developers to crush their protests. As a result, six villagers were killed and about 50 
injured were admitted to hospital.
348
 This highlights the potential dangers of peasant 
protests. The CCP itself has also been wary of peasant dissent and has been known to 
suppress a significant number of demonstrations.  
Doig comments on the contradiction between Party policy, which promotes 
the expression of peasants’ complaints, yet fears the potential outcomes of such 
assertion.349 Policy-based resisters have been identified as posing the greatest threat 
not only to individual officials’ power but also to the rule of the local government.350 
The legitimacy of their actions puts the law on their side, and they are well aware of 
this fact. At the same time, their non-violent resistance is also more easily brushed 
aside by both local and central authorities. Lam writes that even though more and 
more citizens have begun suing the government, particularly for local officials’ 
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unauthorised seizure of farmland, only a small number of cases are successful.
351
  
Petitioning, while it is a legitimate means of complaining, is also largely ineffective, 
and according to officials commenting for the Hong Kong Economic Journal in 2004 
only 0.2 percent of petitioners’ cases were adequately resolved. Furthermore, local 
officials staunchly try to prevent farmers from petitioning at the central level.
352
 
Lodging letters of complaint to higher levels of government may be successful in 
disciplining or even removing a dishonest cadre from office, but this form of protest 
can also be unsuccessful: “activists may give up, be bribed, be repressed, resort to 
violence, be imprisoned or even become cadres themselves.”353  
The success of peasant complaints is ultimately dependent on the response of 
the central government. In light of this, it is important to examine the government’s 
response to the rising levels of discontent. 
 
Early government responses 
 
During Deng and Jiang’s time, the central government was not oblivious to the 
problems behind the increase in rural unrest, nor was it completely negligent in its 
attempt to tackle the issue. For example, in an attempt to stop rural officials from 
demanding excessive taxes and fees from peasants, the centre issued no less than 25 
edicts concerning rural burdens between October 1985 and March 1996, according to 
Fazhi Ribao
354
, demonstrating its strong intention to promote peace and fairness in the 
countryside. Unfortunately, the centre has had extreme difficulty in enforcing such 
directives, as they have often been ignored or wrongly enforced by local cadres. An 
example of a more recent measure introduced by Jiang’s government was the tax-for-
fee reform policy, or feigaishui, instituted in 2001 in order to reduce peasant burdens 
by replacing the tiliu and tongchou and other fees with only one tax – either the 
agricultural or special agricultural products tax, along with an associated surcharge. 
The reform also involved increased accountability for local authorities’ collection of 
taxes.355 The new policy has reduced peasant burdens in some villages: in 2002 it 
enabled the total amount of taxes and fees peasants paid to drop by 30 percent, 
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amounting to 30 billion yuan in savings.
356
 However, the tax reform’s long-term 
effectiveness has yet to be seen. One of the major shortcomings of feigaishui is that it 
drastically reduces local government revenue, and so local governments must make 
up for this loss by increasing economic development.
 357
 The centre intends to 
counteract this by providing “fiscal safety nets” for those localities in dire need and 
providing more subsidies for rural areas.358 In this way, the success of feigaishui is 
ultimately up to the ability of the central government to support the poorer rural 
governments financially. A number of scholars have questioned the central 
government’s ability to sustain this kind of support. For example, Peking University 
economist Justin Lin believes that the central government’s financial situation is 
inadequate to prop up the provinces in the long term.359 It seems that while the reform 
may eliminate the ad hoc fees and charges that have so embittered peasants, feigaishui 
may not help to break the vicious cycle of low government revenue in rural regions.   
Jiang’s government did see some success in tackling the problem of 
unauthorized tax and fee exactions. According to Yu Jianrong, there has been a 
reduction in rural protests against excessive taxes and fees since 2000.360 However, at 
the same time, demonstrations against land seizures have increased significantly. 
Shortly prior to the 16
th
 Party Congress held in 2002, demonstrations and petitions 
were rife.
361
 This is evidence that rural protest remained a dilemma at the fourth 
generation of leadership’s coming to power.  
Neither was the central government unaware of the problem of corruption 
among its officials. In Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 16th Party Congress, he admitted: 
 
 Public order is still poor in some places. Formalism, the bureaucratic 
style of work, falsification, extravagance, and waste are still serious 
problems among some leading cadres in our Party, and corruption is 
still conspicuous in some places…Some Party organizations are feeble 
and lax. We must pay close attention to these problems and continue to 
take effective measures to solve them.362 
 
Among his list of goals to pursue, Jiang declared: 
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We must maintain the Party's nature and purposes, strengthen and 
improve Party building in the spirit of reform, enhance the Party's art 
of leadership and governance, increase its capability of fighting 
corruption and guarding against degeneration and risks and make 
unremitting efforts to combat corruption. The Party must keep its 
flesh-and-blood ties with the people as well as its progressiveness, 
purity, solidarity and unity.
363
 
 
This shows that even in the Jiang era the central government recognised that its 
relationship with the masses was dependent on fighting corruption in the Party and 
government at all levels. 
 A chief problem in early government responses was the central government’s 
inability to enforce its policies locally. As mentioned above, local governments were 
granted greater autonomy at the beginning of the reform era, and this autonomy has 
given rise to the independent actions of rural officials. Unfortunately for China’s rural 
masses, the Party’s response to local government’s non-compliance has been 
inconsistent, sometimes disciplining the local officials in question, while at other 
times choosing not to interfere. Fan writes: “The central government tries to balance 
its support of local officials with its protection of the legitimate interests of common 
people. Sometimes Beijing punishes local governments in order to defuse popular 
tension, sometimes it allows local governments to pursue their interests freely”.364  
The key to the centre’s variable responses throughout the Deng and Jiang eras 
was maintaining stability throughout the nation. It would take whatever course of 
action was most capable of ensuring national stability. This included not only social 
stability, but also economic stability and growth. As has been shown in Chapter 1, in 
its pursuit of economic growth, the centre largely disregarded the plight of the 
peasants, and this was also true of its response to their discontent. China’s leaders 
were for the most part too preoccupied with attaining rapid GDP growth to focus on 
policies to appease the unhappy under classes. Nevertheless, in his outgoing speech at 
the 16th Party Congress, Jiang exhorted:  
 
Ensure stability as a principle of overriding importance and balance 
reform, development and stability…We should press ahead with 
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reform and development amidst social stability and promote social 
stability through reform and development.365  
 
Despite these bold words, rural conflict continued well after Jiang’s exit.  
  
Response from Hu’s government 
 
Since coming to power, the Hu administration has been projecting an image of yiren 
weiben, or “putting people first.”366 Another major essential catchphrase of Hu’s 
policy focus is “Building a Harmonious Socialist Society.” This pro-people vision 
implies that China’s leaders have recognised the great degree of disharmony in their 
society and that they are bent on achieving social justice and so improving this 
situation. The central government under Hu’s leadership has put together a package of 
policies and concrete strategies in order to meet these abstract goals. Some of these 
strategies are focused specifically on developing China’s rural regions, and will be 
examined below. Alvin So describes the new policy shift toward rural development as 
a transition from ‘Neoliberal Capitalism’ to ‘State Developmentalism’.367 In other 
words, this means focusing less on the pursuit of GDP growth and instead 
concentrating on the sustainability of development and on its social consequences.  
But beyond the obvious need to establish a relatively equal, just society lies a 
deeper motive for China’s leaders to shift their focus to the underprivileged classes 
such as the peasants and rural migrants. The rural phenomenon of officials extorting 
extra taxes and fees from local residents, the profusion of land seizures and the 
persistence of corruption in the local government have all served to eat away at the 
people’s faith in their local leaders. The perpetuation of demonstrations and rioting in 
the countryside is evidence of this. Yet on a deeper level, a crucial reason for 
addressing rural unrest is the possibility that the dissatisfaction in the countryside 
might in turn serve to undermine the legitimacy of the centre, which has so far failed 
to address these problems effectively. Is the extent of rural unrest that has developed 
during the post-Mao era now sufficient to pose a strong challenge to the legitimacy of 
the current political regime? This is an important question that Hu’s generation of 
leaders must ask. 
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 This question can, in fact, be argued either way. On one hand, some scholars 
have commented that the lack of a cohesive, unified movement among China’s rural 
protesters means that the centre does not need to fear the possibility of being 
overthrown. Bernstein and Lü point out that “Rural protests were limited in impact 
because they were in the main dispersed and localized, with little direct evidence of 
co-ordination”.368 They refer to the period from the mid 1980s to the late 1990s. 
Knight and Song agree, saying that the manifestation of peasant discontent has up 
until the present not posed a serious threat to the regime because of the “fragmented, 
localized, unorganized nature of peasant society”.369 Oi states that since the peasants’ 
wrath has been focused on local-level officials in the reform era, particularly since the 
late 1990s, “The central state never lost control of the countryside”.370 Alvin So 
believes that despite the frequent peasant protests, the state of unrest in the 
countryside does not signify a political upheaval or show that the current political 
regime is at risk.371 He argues that China’s rural dissidents have demonstrated their 
reliance on the central government to restore peace, order and justice in the 
countryside. When they appeal to the higher authorities, the key message that these 
peasants want to express is that there are inconsistencies between that which the 
central government has decreed and what local governments – especially township 
governments – are putting into practice. This means that “it is the central government 
which is often invoked as the source of authority against which township government 
has offended”.
372
 These arguments do not deny the problem of unrest; rather, they 
merely dismiss the potential of the current level of discontent to escalate into state-
threatening disorder and chaos.  
 While it may be true that localized unrest directed at local officials and 
governments is less of a threat than uprisings against the central government, this 
study argues that the frequent and widespread occurrence of such protests – which are 
often violent – represents a pattern of unrest that, if left to continue, could eventually 
undermine the centre. There are several reasons that point to this possibility. 
Firstly, although peasant protests have been largely directed at local officials, 
the general situation of discontent in the countryside is exacerbated by the problems 
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of rural-urban inequality and the treatment of rural migrant workers as an underclass 
described in Chapters 1 and 2. Both farmers residing in the countryside and migrant 
workers living in the cities are becoming increasingly aware of the great disparity 
between their living conditions and those of the growing urban middle and upper 
classes, and may soon come to appreciate fully the injustices they have been 
suffering. Both of these groups could pose a threat to the central government if it 
continues to prove impotent to address these injustices.  
Secondly, despite the unorganised and localised nature of rural conflict 
displayed in the past, in recent years rural activists’ strategies have begun to change. 
Peasants have become more used to the idea of using resources such as newspapers, 
television and official documents to disseminate their protests.373 Communication is 
easier in the twenty-first century with the increasing proliferation of the internet, 
mobile phones, and other such technology. Peasants today are also more aware of 
their rights, and are more exposed to the vast difference between their situation and 
that of the urban middle and upper classes. This applies particularly to rural migrants, 
who are faced daily with extreme disparities in living conditions from their urban 
neighbours. Migrants, especially those in large cities, represent a significant threat as 
they can more easily congregate and organise themselves for collective resistance. 
The more resources protesters get their hands on, and the more collective and 
organised the demonstrations become, the greater the risk to the central government.  
Thirdly, in the eyes of China’s rural people, the perpetual lagging behind of 
the countryside, neglect of rural issues, and the decades-old segregation between the 
countryside and the cities surely inspires little confidence in the central government. 
If peasants continue to be brushed aside, in future years it may be the central 
administration, rather than local governments, that is blamed for its ineffectiveness in 
the ruling and management of lower level governments. Unhappy peasants have been 
reported to express their desire to see a modern day Chen Sheng and Wu Guang rise 
up; these two characters were leaders of the first great peasant uprising of the Qin 
dynasty.374 While this kind of bold comment does not indicate an impending peasant 
uprising, it does show a degree of disillusionment with the central government, not 
just with the rule of local officials. The centre needs to work harder at restoring Party-
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peasant relations before the peasants completely lose faith in their top leaders and take 
extreme measures to express this. One article states: 
 
At least a considerable number of workers and impoverished peasants 
feel that the Party represents the interests of those who have 
knowledge, capability, and wealth rather than their interests, and they 
have a centrifugal tendency. If the Communist Party does not take 
action to improve its relations with the working class and impoverished 
peasants, it will be very hard for the Party to gain their support.375 
 
Furthermore, it was mentioned above that local officials have been taking 
advantage of cheap peasant labour in order to benefit personally. This may not yet 
have contributed to the problem of unrest, but if labour rights violations continue, it 
may ultimately become a source of instability in rural China. According to Yongnian 
Zheng, “China is now facing a rising tide of labour disputes, which could destabilise 
Chinese society and thus undermine the political legitimacy of the CCP”.376 This 
threat from inside may be further exacerbated by international pressure to improve 
labour rights in China, especially given China’s relatively recent accession to the 
World Trade Organisation.  
Pye points out that “the Chinese public is strongly supportive of stability, for 
as we all know a key feature of the Chinese political culture is a deep-seated fear of 
luan or chaos”.
377
 If China’s leaders have recognised the problems described above as 
potential threats to the continuation of Party rule, and there is no doubt that they have, 
they can no longer afford to ignore the issues of rural discontent and social injustice. 
The current government under Hu’s leadership is now taking concrete steps to 
reduce the extent of rural unrest. These include new policies and initiatives, as well as 
the continuation and improvement of measures initiated during the Deng and Jiang 
eras. Their strategies include increased investment in rural affairs through the rural 
development programme ‘Building a New Socialist Countryside’, deepening the 
reform of the rural administrative system, and improving the effectiveness of village 
elections. The following sections will first describe these solutions, then assess their 
potential to ensure a stable China in the twenty-first century and solve the problems 
that have been afflicting rural China for the past several decades. 
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Building a New Socialist Countryside 
 
A first major effort to promote stability in the countryside is the newly initiated rural 
development programme ‘Building a New Socialist Countryside’. This programme is 
designed to stimulate the rural economy by increasing local governments’ revenue 
and so make local officials less dependent on exacting illegal fees from the peasants. 
The programme is also expected to reduce the rural-urban gap, which is in itself a 
reason for peasants to be discontented, as they undoubtedly envy those who are 
considerably more prosperous and sense the injustice of the huge rural-urban 
disparity. Thus the idea behind Building a New Socialist Countryside is that a reduced 
peasant burden should help to bring equality between the countryside and the city, 
essentially making the countryside more ‘harmonious’.  
The strategy is aimed at raising the standard of living of rural residents, 
improving their access to and funding for social services, and investing a higher 
percentage of China’s national budget in agriculture, infrastructure, and other rural 
affairs (See Chapter 1 for more a more detailed mapping out of these concrete goals).  
China’s current leaders have also recognised the negative impact that unrest in 
the countryside has had on the rural economy. Building a New Socialist Countryside 
aims to stimulate the rural economy by reducing this conflict. As discussed in Chapter 
1, the rural development programme is intended to encourage rural consumption, 
which has remained low not only because of low rural incomes but also because of 
the unstable situation in the countryside. As low domestic consumption has left 
China’s economy to rely on fixed-interest investment and exports, the sustainability of 
economic growth is waning. What is more, the persistence of rural unrest has 
discouraged investment in rural areas, further contributing to the rural-urban gap.  
How effective has Building a New Socialist Countryside been to date in 
improving the state of affairs? China’s official media lauds the progress of this rural 
development programme. China’s web portal is laden with reports of farmers’ lives 
being radically changed as a result of the government’s increased investment. Take 
for example Li Zhen, a Guangdong farmer who once worked in a village plant while 
her husband bred chickens on a small scale. The couple made around 20,000 yuan per 
year between them. After 2002, the two joined an animal husbandry group and began 
raising chickens on a large scale, and a few years later made 100,000 yuan in one 
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year. Li’s success, as well as that of others who have joined such joint enterprise 
groups, is a result of the “scientific development outlook”, according to Zhang 
Dejiang, Party Secretary of Guangdong Province.
378
 Then there is Shangping village 
in Xihaigu region in Ningxia Autonomous Region, once a poverty-stricken mountain 
hamlet in north-west China. While still poor compared to more prosperous rural 
regions, Shangping received 1.2 million yuan in investment from the central 
government in 2005 for infrastructure and vocational training, according to Wang 
Dianzhong, the village committee head. The village used part of the funds to build a 
new sand road to connect it to the outside, as well as to provide villagers with 
microwave antennae for their household televisions. As a result of the increased level 
in development, the net income of villagers in the region increased on average 14.17 
percent per year over the five years leading up to 2006, and the number of those living 
in absolute poverty dropped from 527,000 in 2000 to 152,000 in 2004.379 
 Statistics showing the reduction of taxes and the increase in farmers’ incomes 
are also proudly publicised. For example, in the first three quarters of 2005, peasants’ 
average expenditure on taxes and fees decreased by 62 percent.380 According to a 
report by the National Development and Reform Commission, in the first three 
quarters of 2006, the average cash income of farmers increased 11.4 percent as a 
result of the government’s favourable policies (this figure does not account for 
inflation).
381
 Early in 2008 the centre announced its plan to increase spending on rural 
development by 30 percent for the year, amounting to an increase of 562.5 billion 
yuan from 2007.382  
 Success stories and figures such as these suggest that the government has so 
far been working hard to put words into action in terms of raising the standard of 
living of rural residents. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, it will take a long time 
for all of China’s farmers to benefit from the new policies. What is more, the 
programme’s success is dependent on the cooperation of local governments, which 
the centre has not always been assured of. It is also important to ask whether Building 
a New Socialist Countryside is an effective measure for reducing rural unrest. This 
question will be addressed further on.   
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The shortcoming of this rural development programme is that while the main 
focus of Building a New Socialist Countryside is investing more money in rural 
infrastructure, education, health care and agricultural technology, it does not address 
the issue of unauthorised land expropriation. The current government is attempting to 
solve this problem through the PRC Property Law, which was mentioned earlier. The 
law, while addressing urban property rights as well, seeks to increase the security of 
allowing automatic extension of land leases. It also seeks to protect farmers’ land 
rights by requiring full compensation to farmers if their land should be 
expropriated.383 As the law has only been recently instituted, however, its 
effectiveness has yet to be seen. This will depend largely on the successful 
enforcement of the law, and also on the systems put in place to allow farmers to 
bargain for their rights to compensation should their land be taken from them.  
Although Building a New Socialist Countryside does not address the land 
rights issue, it is possible that the expected increase in the level of development of the 
countryside will bring economic growth, which should in turn increase local 
government revenue and so prevent local officials from trying to make fast money by 
selling off rural land. Another important point to highlight is that the effectiveness of 
this programme is also dependent upon eliminating the problem of rural cadres’ 
unauthorised fee and tax exactions from rural residents, as well as reducing corruption 
to ensure that government funds do not find their way into officials’ pockets. As the 
plans for the New Socialist Countryside are applied, the central government will have 
to ensure that appropriate monitoring systems are in place so that the fiscal transfers 
to the countryside will be of maximum benefit to the localities and not end up in the 
pockets of local officials.  
Rather than allow land privatisation, Hu’s government is instead introducing a 
fee to be charged for land that remains idle for more than one year and less than two 
years, as well as quintupling the tax on arable land used for non-farming purposes. 
The centre hopes that by instituting these measures, it will be able to better control the 
loss of farmland and improve the efficiency of land use.384 Furthermore, the current 
government is cracking down on the unauthorised transfer of household land to 
property developers and the transfer of land without following the appropriate 
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regulations by punishing those individuals and enterprises involved.
385
 However, the 
effectiveness of these new strategies and the tightening of control over land transfers 
has yet to be seen.  
 
Rural administrative reforms 
 
Hu’s government also aims to reduce rural unrest by the continuation of the rural 
administrative reforms that were begun during Jiang’s time. A number of problems in 
the system have been identified and are now targets of reform. 
First of all, there are too many levels of administration and huge numbers of 
superfluous government workers, resulting in inefficiency. Brown writes that for 
every 40 people, there is one government worker employed by the central state, which 
contrasts with the ratio of 300 to one during the Qing dynasty and 8,000 to one in the 
Han dynasty.386 The central government during Jiang’s era began to address this 
problem by reducing government personnel. Beginning in 1998, Zhu Rongji, the 
Premier at the time, ordered the simplification of lower level government including a 
great number of mergers of administrative units and cut-downs of staff, including the 
reduction of central government ministries from forty to twenty-nine.
387
 However, the 
administrative streamlining process during Jiang’s era was mostly limited to central-
level bureaucrats and institutions. The initiative is continuing under the Hu-Wen 
leadership, but under the direction of current Premier Wen Jiabao the reforms now 
include rural government. The main targets of the rural reforms are the administrative 
levels between the county and the village – that is, the xiang (rural township) and zhen 
(township).388 Wen believes that the continued reform of the administration is the key 
to alleviating the peasant burden.389 Recently, a large number of Party posts have been 
cut in certain provinces.390 This is being done to help the local population save money 
by cutting administrative costs,391 particularly in light of the rescinding of the 
agricultural tax. Without the tax coming in, local governments’ revenue is lessened, 
creating a need to cut down superfluous government personnel. According to official 
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estimates in 2003, it took around twenty-five peasants to pay the salary of one local 
cadre, although in a number of poorer villages, a mere eight or nine peasants were 
expected to pay for each cadre. Such expenses have resulted in huge debts incurred by 
many local government administrations.
392
 These figures highlight the burden of 
excessive government personnel that peasants have had to shoulder.  
So far the reforms have been somewhat successful in slashing and merging 
towns and townships. Towards the end of 2003, the total number of towns had 
dropped by 375 to 20,226 throughout all of China; townships had decreased by 575 to 
18,064; and 950 towns and townships had merged. The first nine months of 2004 saw 
864 towns and townships merged or cut, which shows slowing progress but progress 
all the same.393 A prime example of what has been going on in terms of reducing 
townships is in Jilin province. Since the beginning of the administrative reforms, Jilin 
has cut out and merged 291 townships, which is apparently saving 140 million yuan 
per year as a result of the dissolution of 1,874 government jobs.394  
A second reason for the administrative reforms is in order to tackle the issue of 
corruption in its various forms. Township governments in particular have been a 
prime target of rural demonstrations in recent years; this can partially be attributed to 
the dishonest dealings of many officials at this level. In the process of reforming the 
administrative system, the central government aims specifically at weeding out those 
officials who are corrupt. China’s current leadership is firmly committed to cracking 
down on acts of corruption, even among the higher ranks of the Party. While Jiang’s 
administration was not blind to the problem of corruption, Hu’s government is 
continuing the process diligently. Lam believes that Hu is more serious about fighting 
corruption in the Party and government ranks than was either Deng or Jiang, and is 
likely to be more successful, considering his firm relationship with Wu Guanzheng, 
the head of the CCDI (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection).395 A well-
known example of Hu’s government’s drive to wipe out corruption was the 2006 
downfall of Shanghai’s now ex-Party chief, Chen Liangyu396. Although Chen and 
many other high-level Party officials being rooted out for corruption are urban-based, 
their toppling is a warning to Party officials at all levels – including village, township 
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and county levels – that the central government is serious about this issue. 
Unfortunately, old habits die hard, and it will not be an easy task to remove corruption 
completely from among the Party and government.  
Regarding the reform of the administrative system, the response of China’s 
citizens has been positive so far, at least according to official Chinese media. The 
China Youth Daily reports that the general public is happy that the burden is 
somewhat reduced and that the administration is becoming more efficient.397 On the 
other hand, the reforms have also been met with “stiff resistance” from those officials 
whose positions have been cut. It is easy enough for laid-off central level officials to 
find alternative employment, but this is not the case for many grassroots-level 
officials.398 Despite the painful process of restructuring and creating redundancies, 
this process is crucial for the increased efficiency of the rural administration.  
While the administrative reforms may be effective in reducing local 
government expenditure on personnel, thus reducing peasant burdens, it remains to be 
seen whether the centre can effectively improve the quality of local leaders through 
these reforms. It needs to make certain that its mandates and policies are being 
effectively carried out by local authorities − something that has not been the case 
during much of the reform era. As one senior Party leader during the late stage of 
Jiang’s rule said, 
 
Modernization has led to the decentralization of decision-making and 
to an empowering of the lower-level officials in much of China. The 
system’s decentralization makes the central level less relevant. It used 
to be that when the Party centre spoke, the people all listened and 
obeyed. That day is gone.
399
  
 
Village elections 
 
Among the wide variety of attempts Hu’s government is making to answer the 
peasants’ discontent is the improvement of the village election system. The institution 
of competitive village elections was actually one of the central government’s key 
responses to the elevated level of unrest in the countryside during Deng’s time. These 
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elections for village officials began in the mid-1980s
400
 and the associated legislation, 
the Organic Law of Village Committees, or cunweihui zuzhi fa, appeared in draft form 
in 1987.
401
 The law began to be more deeply implemented in 1998 by stipulating that 
one million villages would hold direct elections for their leaders, choosing from 
multiple candidates by secret ballot.
402
 Under the law, villagers were to be able to 
elect their village leaders as well as the village committees.403  
How are the village elections intended to reduce unrest in the countryside? 
They are intended to mobilise local pressure against officials who do not obey central 
government mandates and who act dishonestly. In this way, the central government 
hopes to achieve successful implementation of its policies while maintaining its 
power in the countryside. At the same time, according to Oi, “Village elections are a 
pressure valve to let peasants vent their dissatisfaction, but one meant to point the 
responsibility for continued poverty and poor leadership in villages away from the 
central authorities”.404 That is, the institution of popularly elected village officials is 
supposed to shift more responsibility for rural affairs onto the village officials and 
onto peasants themselves, so that they have less legitimate reason to protest against 
both the local and the central government, and in this way maintaining stability in 
rural areas. The elections were also instituted to improve peasant-cadre relations,
405
 
which have been less than ideal during the reform era, as is evident in the increasing 
level of rural conflict. Brown writes that peasants seem to be “victims of the whims of 
party officials”.
406
 By choosing their own local leaders through the elections, villagers 
are supposed to have a sense of participation in local affairs, and they are able to 
select the leaders they feel best represent their interests. Village elections are also 
intended to improve accountability among village officials by providing a greater 
degree of citizen oversight, and in this way lessen corruption.407 In this way, it is 
hoped that rural conflict will lessen. 
The institution of village elections has been successful to a certain extent. 
More voters are becoming active and the quality of elections has improved since the 
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early 1990s.
408
 By 2004, 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in 
China had put together procedures for village committee elections.
409
 By 2005, about 
300,000 villages in 18 provinces had actually instituted village elections.
410
 In some 
villages where elections have been held, spending by officials on behalf of the village 
has been more transparent.
411
   
The elections have also had some limitations. One of the shortcomings of the 
election system is that so far it has only been instituted in the villages. Rural protests 
are often aimed at the township level of government, rather than at the village level.412 
Since township officials are not popularly elected (although peasants in villages do 
elect People’s Congress deputies, who in turn elect township officials),413 peasants 
have no say as to who is in power at this level. Thus the extent of peasant democracy 
so far has been somewhat limited and has not effectively eliminated rural conflict. Not 
only this, but while village officials are supposed to represent their villagers and listen 
to their concerns, at the same time their independence is limited as they also have to 
obey directives from above. In the words of William P. Alford, who is professor of 
law and director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard Law School, “village 
committees exist in large part to administer policies dictated from above more 
effectively.”
414
 Even though village elections enable peasants to have a small voice in 
local politics, they are still pitifully underrepresented in higher levels of the Party and 
government.
415
 
 What is more, village elections have not always prove to be completely 
democratic in nature, and interferences such as rigged voting, protectionism and 
enforced tax collection have rendered some village elections ineffective.416 Some 
candidates have been known to buy votes through bribing villagers.417 Reports have 
also spoken of the lack of competition in some village elections, as well as the 
absence of secrecy in balloting418. This kind of behaviour has only brought more 
corrupt and inefficient officials into power in the countryside. On top of this, the CCP 
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has a huge influence on the choice of village committee candidates, undermining the 
supposedly democratic and autonomous nature of the elections.
419
 
 Another weakness of the village election system is that it has not been 
implemented consistently throughout rural China. It has proved to be more popular in 
the coastal areas than in China’s inland regions. This is due to a “stronger democratic 
awareness” in the more developed regions.420 Unfortunately, it is the poorer, inland 
rural areas where change is most needed, but also where lack of resources and funding 
has prevented the kind of rapid development that other areas have seen in the past two 
to three decades. As low revenue and local government corruption are associated with 
each other, the inland regions have also seen the most widespread resistance from 
villagers against their local leaders, thus furthering their need for a stronger 
democratic movement. 
Hu’s government hopes to deepen rural reform by improving the effectiveness 
of village elections and the honesty and morality of village committee candidates. The 
Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee has recognised the need for improved 
transparency in village elections,421 although it is unclear how the government intends 
to accomplish this. Many observers from inside and outside China are also 
questioning whether the success of village elections will encourage the central 
government to institute similar direct elections at higher levels in order to improve the 
quality of the leadership and allow the general public a voice in the political selection 
process. At present, at the very top levels of the Party, there continues to be little 
accountability, and the transfer of leadership is still very much an elitist system that is 
dependent on personal ties and guanxi rather than being truly democratic.422 Chi 
writes that there is a conflict between rising democratic awareness in the villages and 
the absence of democratic institutions at higher levels of government.423 However, the 
current government has shown no intentions of instituting direct elections above the 
grassroots level.424 This is because it intends to maintain and strengthen, not loosen, 
control of the lower levels of government through grassroots democracy. 
 
What are the prospects for rural China? 
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It is important to discuss not only how successful is Hu’s government likely to be in 
restoring peace to the countryside, but also whether the current endeavours are 
enough to maintain the legitimacy of the CCP’s reign in the eyes of China’s masses. 
This study argues that although the policies and programmes being pursued by the 
current government may be extremely successful in improving the standard of living 
of China’s rural citizens and considerably reducing their burdens, there are a number 
of reasons why their success in reducing rural conflict is likely to be somewhat 
limited. 
For a start, many observers believe that an economic facelift in the countryside 
is insufficient to get to the root of rural unrest. There is no doubt that the Hu-Wen 
administration was on the right track when it shifted its policy to focus on social 
justice and equality. Oi believes that “Until the state institutes a viable long-term 
solution that provides villages and townships with an adequate level of financing, the 
provision of public goods will suffer and peasant burdens will be likely to re-emerge 
as a thorn in state-peasant relations in China”.425 China’s leaders are attempting just 
that – to increase investment at the grassroots level in order to improve the 
relationship between the rural masses and their leaders. However, the goals of 
eliminating poverty and stimulating the rural economy do not address some of the 
other fundamental problems inherent in the countryside.  
For example, the land tenure system remains intact, preventing peasants from 
owning their own farmland. Even though Hu’s government is cracking down on 
unauthorised land transfers, this does not guarantee that peasants’ land rights will 
become more secure. While privatisation is certainly not the only answer, the 
government needs to go deeper in its reforms to prevent further land seizures. Brandt, 
Huang, Guo and Rozelle believe that “political reforms at the local level are needed to 
provide the kinds of property rights a rapidly growing economy requires”.426 
Essentially, this is a call for reforms that will provide farmers with more secure land 
rights – whether it be through privatisation, longer land tenure agreements, or more 
leak-proof land contracts – while taking control of the land from local officials, or at 
least giving these officials incentives not to misuse their control. The new Property 
Law does allow for longer land tenure agreements, but as mentioned earlier, its 
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success will depend on whether or not it is effectively enforced. Zhu and Li also point 
out that the law needs to be widely publicised, and the people’s courts  need to both 
make themselves accessible to farmers and to treat cases in an unbiased manner.
427
  
Another shortcoming of the policies described above is that they do not 
guarantee local implementation of central government policies. A higher degree of 
accountability among local officials’ behaviour and business dealings is necessary. 
There is little evidence that merely streamlining local government administration will 
effectively achieve this, nor will it be able to address the problem of corruption in the 
local government and Party apparatus successfully. The glitch here is that there is 
little separation between those who make the policies and those who implement them 
and supervise their implementation. The Party’s ubiquitous presence pervades 
everything – the courts, democratic elections, and even its own auditing and 
supervisory bodies.  
It seems that the current government wants to reduce rural conflict by 
stimulating the rural economy and by reforming the behaviour of individual local 
officials, but without effectively changing the problematic structures that are in place. 
Fan points out that while China’s leaders speak about social harmony and putting 
people first, they also prioritise stability and social order.
428
 This idea indicates that 
China’s top leaders are attempting to achieve two goals simultaneously: they aim to 
reduce conflict and keep the people content, while at the same time they are intent on 
sustaining one-Party rule in China. In order to meet these two goals, the Party’s 
strategy is to achieve social justice and improve the standard of living of China’s 
citizens without political liberalisation. In previous years, the CCP sought to 
strengthen its own legitimacy as the sole ruling party by focusing on achieving 
national economic performance and propagating the theme of patriotism.429 However, 
with such a large section of China’s population disenfranchised and still struggling to 
make ends meet, such goals are no longer sufficient to ensure the people’s faith in 
their leaders. Economic performance is still important, although the catchphrase being 
disseminated today is ‘sustainable development’. Lam believes that “Hu and his 
Politburo colleagues seem convinced that the CCP might be able to prolong its 
mandate of heaven if it can successfully nurture a relatively prosperous, pro-status 
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quo middle class.”
430
 In other words, comfortably well-off citizens will be happy 
citizens. While Lam may be right that Hu’s government does seek to care for the 
middle class, it also realises that the key to the CCP’s survival lies in addressing the 
needs of the nation’s peasants and migrant workers. Nurturing a middle class will not 
guarantee long term stability in China’s countryside. In the words of one writer: 
“Economic development cannot by itself imperceptibly eliminate or prevent political 
turmoil”.431 
What, then, is needed? Many scholars believe that rather than merely 
streamlining the government administration and making efforts to raise the moral 
standard and efficiency of government and Party officials, deeper political reform is 
necessary. Eyferth, Ho and Vermeer believe that the good intentions of China’s top 
leaders are not enough. They state: “Without political reform resulting in greater 
transparency and accountability of local government and more public participation in 
politics there is little hope that corruptive trends will stop”.432 Lam also questions the 
current administration’s ability to clean up the Party and government without 
instituting more democratic institutions and a system of checks and balances 
independent of the Party. He points out that the CCDI’s approach to tackling 
corruption is not much different from that of the Maoist regime – it remains merely a 
matter of emphasising political correctness and moral virtue.
433
 These scholars argue 
that what is needed is more outlets for China’s rural citizens to seek amends for the 
injustices they have suffered. Brown argues that currently “the system seems ill-
designed to cope in any meaningful way with the level of complaints now being 
raised against it”.434 Up until the present day, these outlets for peasants to raise 
complaints have been few and far between, and the channels that do exist for peasants 
to express discontent are not independent from the CCP. The Party, however, seems 
unwilling to break this pattern, lest it undermine its monopoly on power.  
The current administration does frequently refer to democracy, but its idea of 
democracy is dangnei minzhu, or “intra-party democracy.” This development is likely 
to bring a number of positive changes to the Chinese political system. David 
Shambaugh believes that “The goal is to create a dynamic party apparatus, rather than 
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an ossified and inflexible one.”
435
 According to Chinese experts, developing dangnei 
minzhu is important for overall political restructuring and building “political 
civilization” in China. Dangnei minzhu allows for members to have a greater voice in 
the selection of cadres and the making of policy.
436
 It is aimed at creating more 
transparent governance by allowing for more checks and balances within the system 
and an increased level of supervision by the people. However, these remain “Checks 
and balances with Chinese Characteristics”,437 indicating that this kind of democracy 
by no means constitutes the development of civil society because it does not allow for 
more diverse political organisations, only greater diversity within the Communist 
Party itself. This continues to leave China’s rural citizens with no choice but to go 
through the Party-affiliated channels to voice their opinions and complaints. It is clear 
that at least in the near future, China’s dominant political party is unlikely to make 
itself vulnerable to relinquishing its monopoly on power.  
Lewis and Xue’s opinion is that when it comes to reacting to the rising social 
pressures for political reform, China’s leaders have three choices: they can suppress 
such pressure, allow the problem of corruption to continue, or invite more open 
participation in political matters.
438
 When Hu became the nation’s president in 2003, 
he proclaimed a commitment to “developing democracy and doing things according 
to the law.”
439
 It is tempting to observe the central government’s preoccupation with 
village democracy and envisage the further expansion of direct elections at higher 
levels. This will not necessarily be the case, however, as has been discussed earlier. 
Oi points out that “China is a country riddled with policy contradictions. While it 
arrests dissidents, it also promotes democratic village elections and encourages 
peasants to attend village assembly meetings.”440 Yongnian Zheng believes that while 
China’s future does involve democratisation, it first requires a process of state-
building that can be considered part of political reform.441 This opinion seems to line 
up with the excuse frequently used by China’s leaders for delaying the institution of 
higher-level direct elections: the situation of the village electoral system is still 
unsatisfactory, and that only after these grassroots elections are further improved will 
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China move on to higher-level elections.
442
 And yet this appears to be a stalling 
technique to avoid more liberal political reform. Many scholars do not see liberal 
democratization and the development of civil society in China as inevitable processes. 
Burns writes that even though China’s leaders have acknowledged the need for 
political reform since 1952, the idea of reform has never included the end of the 
Communist one-party rule. Rather, it has meant reform inside the existing Party 
structure, included efforts to improve the Party’s efficiency through the restructuring 
of government departments and the reform of the civil service system.443 It is likely 
that this kind of intra-Party reform will continue under Hu’s leadership, although to 
predict more radical reform may be going too far. Lam believes that although Hu is 
concerned with corruption and inefficiency in the Party, he is quite comfortable with 
the idea of the CCP’s monopoly on power and its ideological stance.444 This suggests 
that political reform, in the form of a democratic multi-party system that many foreign 
observers have been speculating about, is not imminent. 
Why are the top Party leaders so resistant to change in this respect? Without a 
doubt, they fear that to introduce Western-style liberal democracy including direct 
elections at all government and Party levels would ultimately threaten and undermine 
the CCP’s monopoly on power. Lam writes that even though to most Chinese 
“communism has been terminally mothballed”, Hu’s generation of leaders remain 
committed to upholding the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party’s reign.
445
 
Burns writes that “After 50 years of rule, the Party shows no more tolerance of 
opposition than it did in the 1950s, although the methods used to silence dissent may 
have changed somewhat.”446  
Can the Chinese Communist Party effectively achieve its two goals: 
addressing the nation’s rural issues while at the same time maintaining its legitimacy 
in the eyes of the people? In the short term, the goals of sustainable development and 
social justice will win the approval of China’s rural population, and the Party is likely 
to improve the livelihood of many peasants greatly, albeit over a number of years. 
However, even though the central government has so far proved competent to keep 
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rural unrest from threatening its dominance,
447
 it has not been successful in 
eliminating the sources of the pressure for change. The government’s measures to 
reduce rural conflict will most likely serve only as ‘band-aid’ solutions because they 
fail to address the deepest roots of social unrest described below. 
Firstly, the central government has long failed to gain firm control of local 
officials, and is unlikely to succeed in the near future. At present, the benefits of 
ignoring or incorrectly executing central government regulations far outweigh the 
disadvantages in the eyes of some local cadres. There remain too many incentives for 
these cadres to act independently from the central government, and, for the most part, 
they do not fear the centre’s retribution. Resorting to methods of terror and draconian 
social control techniques to bring local officials into line is not a viable option for the 
central government, as it would prove extremely unpopular with the masses. As long 
as the centre struggles to attain the compliance of local cadres and rooting out 
corruption among these cadres and their cronies, it will have trouble implementing its 
policies and programmes and will achieve only partial success.  
Secondly, the huge socioeconomic equalities that China’s people have 
experienced during the last three decades are in part the inevitable consequence of a 
developing market economy. While some regions, such as the eastern urban areas, 
were granted preferential policies and greater access to resources, trade and tax 
incentives, many of these regions also had natural advantages from the beginning, 
which gave them a head-start. Song points out that some of the greatest economic 
disparities in China are geographic.448 Although some of these inequalities could have 
been avoided, a certain degree of inequality must be tolerated in the early stages of an 
economic transition such as China has been undergoing. Rozelle explains that “it may 
be that the lag time before the spillover effects of regionalized growth begin to take 
effect are longer than the period that has passed since the early reforms.”449 
Unfortunately for the peasants, particularly those in inland areas, they are the ones 
who have been left behind in this process. This means that the central government 
must work very hard at helping them to catch up – although the process can only be 
expected to be slow. In the meantime, there is likely to remain a degree of resentment 
from the peasantry because of the persistence of inequality. 
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Finally, as the years progress, China’s rural dissidents are becoming more 
assertive in voicing their opinions and grievances. At the same time, they are 
becoming more organised and, as a group, aware of their collective rights. Aggrieved 
peasants and migrants are geographically more capable of gathering and 
demonstrating in large numbers. The more organised their actions, and the greater the 
number of those protesting, the greater the threat of social instability and the greater 
the pressure on the government to institute deeper political reforms. While the 
government is equally capable of suppressing their protests or ignoring their demands, 
it cannot consistently disregard these pressures in the long term. At the same time, in 
order to preserve its own monopoly on power, the Party cannot afford to institute 
political reforms such as multi-party democracy that would eventuate in social turmoil 
or strengthen existing secession movements. In response to these pressures, the 
central government can only continue to ‘strike a balance’ so as to both preserve its 
rule and minimise social tensions. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
During the reign of Mao, despite the fact that the peasants had formed the Party’s 
power base and so enabled the CCP’s victory over the Guomindang, they were 
fundamentally exploited. While it initially appeared that the Party favoured the 
peasants during the period of land reform, any benefits they reaped were short-lived. 
Not only did the state extract large amounts of grain from the peasants at pitifully low 
prices in order to support urban industrialisation, but the peasants were also tied to the 
land, with the exception of certain periods when their labour force was taken 
advantage of in the cities. Furthermore, China’s rural dwellers bore the brunt of the 
terrible famine immediately after the Great Leap Forward. While peasants were 
obviously mistreated in many ways, there was little in the way of open displays of 
dissent during this time. 
Following Mao’s rule, Deng Xiaoping’s early reform period greatly improved 
the quality of life of large numbers of rural people; many were lifted from poverty, a 
small number grew rich quickly as rural entrepreneurs, and some were able to move 
to the cities as the migration policy was relaxed. However, the peasants did not stay 
the beneficiaries of reform for long. Deng’s second round of reforms allowed the gap 
between the cities and the countryside to widen, and while the cities – in particular 
those along the east coast – saw sudden increases in growth and development, the 
peasants found that agricultural productivity in the countryside stagnated for the most 
part. Township and village enterprises initially flourished, but these also declined in 
later years. While a certain degree of inequality was an inevitable result of China’s 
rapid economic growth,450 its extent was increased by the failure of the central 
government to address the negative social consequences of reform. Those who were 
able to find employment in the cities were treated as an underclass as their agricultural 
hukou status prevented them from receiving equal access to social services and labour 
rights. Furthermore, farmers who remained in the countryside were subject to the high 
taxes, fees and levies demanded by local officials. Others had their land seized in the 
name of rural development, sometimes with little or no compensation. Corruption 
among local officials became rife. Many farmers grew angry because of the behaviour 
of their local leaders, and began to demonstrate their discontent.  
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 These rural problems continued into Jiang’s era, and while the central 
government under Deng and Jiang began to take some measures to improve the 
peasants’ situation, these measures were largely ineffective, and rural-urban 
disparities grew increasingly perceptible. The fourth generation of leaders, led by Hu 
Jintao, has inherited China’s rural problems. Their success in tackling these problems 
is now imperative, not only for the maintenance of social stability, but also for the 
survival of the CCP because of the discontent that has been fostered among the 
peasantry and rural migrants. 
As yet, the peasants’ unrest has been largely directed at local officials rather 
than the central government, and has been primarily unorganised. As a result, it has 
not yet posed a threat to the central government, and social instability has been 
limited to the rural areas. However, there is good reason to believe that if the central 
government fails to find effective solutions to China’s rural problems, the rural 
population may begin to question the potency of its national leaders to govern justly 
and effectively. Furthermore, as peasants become geographically more connected to 
the cities and as they become increasingly able to communicate via technological 
means such as mobile phones and the internet, their protests are likely to become 
more organised and cohesive, posing a greater threat to the central government. If this 
situation emerges, the continued rule of the CCP may be at stake.   
 Throughout the CCP’s reign, its leaders have worked unswervingly to uphold 
the Party’s ‘mandate of heaven.’ The Party’s relationship with the peasants is now a 
crucial factor in this endeavour. Hu’s government believes that addressing the social 
injustices suffered by the peasants (as well as other disadvantaged social groups) will 
help to maintain social stability, ensure the people’s contentment, and thus ensure the 
CCP’s survival. The government’s solution is to ‘Build a Harmonious Socialist 
Society’ by means of ‘Scientific Development.’ This involves a series of concrete 
policies and programmes to reduce rural-urban inequality, improve the sustainability 
of economic growth, address the issues surrounding migration and surplus labour, 
improve rural elections, increase the security of farmers’ land tenure, reform the rural 
administrative system, and crack down on corruption within the Party and 
government.   
 Economically, if the centre is successful in ensuring sustainable development 
rather than heated GDP growth, it will be more capable of narrowing the rural-urban 
gap and, in this way, encouraging social stability in the short term. This will depend 
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largely on its ability to shift from export-and-fixed-interest-based growth to increased 
domestic consumption, particularly rural consumption. This is one of the current 
government’s approaches to tackling the countryside’s economic problems. The new 
policy focus also includes the abolition of the agricultural tax, higher prices paid for 
agricultural products, increased investment in agriculture, social services and 
infrastructure, and improving the efficiency and accountability of the rural 
administration. While China’s leaders are heading in the right direction in terms of 
their policy focus, it is likely to take a considerable amount of time for these 
economic reforms to be successfully implemented. Wong asserts that “all 
development changes will take a long time to yield concrete results.”451 In the 
meantime, peasant discontent will continue. Furthermore, these measures are still a 
‘band-aid’ solution to rural unrest, as economic development in itself is insufficient to 
address all the roots of social tension. 
 Socially, the current administration is committed to providing improved access 
to rural people’s basic needs such as education and health care. The vast rural-urban 
disparities in the quality of and access to these social services have contributed to 
overall inequality. This applies not only to those living in the countryside, but also to 
rural migrants living in urban areas. China’s current leaders have realised that it is 
vital to address these disparities in order to reduce social tension and create a 
‘harmonious society.’ While the increased level of investment in rural social services 
is encouraging, it requires an enormous amount of money and will be successful if the 
investment can be sustained in the long term. Ensuring labour rights for rural migrants 
is also crucial for social stability, but up until now the government has struggled to 
enforce these rights among employers, who are sometimes more concerned with 
achieving their financial goals than paying their employees on time and providing 
them with insurance against work-related accidents. This represents yet another 
challenge for the current generation of leaders, and the situation is likely to take a 
long time to put right. The current government is now working to ensure that 
migrants’ children have equal rights to education. The new labour contract law is one 
effort to improve labour rights, but the results remain to be seen. 
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 In the political realm, Hu and his supporters hope to demonstrate the CCP’s 
transformation from a revolutionary party to an efficient governing party. In light of 
this, they are deeply concerned with the problem of corruption in the Party and 
government. Corruption is one of the chief roots of discontent among China’s rural 
people. China’s leaders are currently seeking to institute reforms to tackle this 
problem, although the extent of these reforms has so far been limited to reform inside 
the existing political apparatus – that is, within the Chinese Communist Party.  
 In terms of rural politics, the central government hopes to improve the 
effectiveness of the village election system. Because the Party has a tight foothold in 
village elections in many places, the democratic nature of these elections has 
frequently been undermined. Candidates have also been known to resort to bribery in 
order to win elections. As the central government has struggled to gain local cadres’ 
total compliance in implementing the appropriate policies and procedures, it is likely 
that progress in improving rural elections will be slow. What is more, up until the 
present, the peasants’ voice in political affairs has been limited to this grassroots 
level. They have little say in the workings of higher levels of rural government, 
despite the fact that it is often decisions made at the township level that affect their 
livelihood. It is unlikely, however, that the central government will establish direct 
elections beyond the village level, at least in the near future.  
 The current political reforms are not limited to local governments, but to all 
levels of the Party and government administration. Recently implemented 
administrative reforms are serving to streamline the Party and government and so 
increase the efficiency of governance, while intra-party democracy, or dangnei 
minzhu, is intended to eradicate corruption and give ordinary Party members a greater 
voice in the processes of policy making and selection of cadres. However, because the 
approach to fighting corruption does not involve systematic checks and balances 
through an agency independent of the CCP,452 the government’s success will likely be 
somewhat limited. This limitation will hinder the development of a ‘harmonious 
society’. At the same time, the deepening of political reforms by taking steps toward 
western-style liberal democracy is not a risk that the current administration is likely to 
take. 
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While Hu’s government is likely to have a certain degree of success in firing 
up the rural economy, improving the standard of living of China’s rural citizens and 
migrants, and improving the efficiency of rural government administration, there is a 
danger that the current reforms will remain surface-level measures. It remains to be 
seen whether these measures will be sufficient to maintain the legitimacy of the 
CCP’s rule in the eyes of China’s rural people in the long term. At present, a number 
of obstacles remain. For a start, the central government has struggled to enforce its 
policies at the local level, and if it is unable to assert its control, this situation will 
likely continue. Since peasant demonstrations have primarily been due to local 
officials’ non-compliance with central government policies, the persistence of this 
problem will likely mean the continuation of peasant unrest. Furthermore, there 
remains a lack of channels for the people to voice their complaints and discontent. As 
a result, those who have lodged complaints in a peaceful manner have in many cases 
been ignored, while those who have chosen to demonstrate more forcefully have often 
been suppressed. As long as the channels for expressing discontent remain limited in 
this way, peasants are likely to find alternative methods of showing their dissent. In 
light of these obstacles, the long term future of China’s rural society remains 
uncertain. It can only be hoped that, in time, it will become ‘harmonious.’ 
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